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IR SCIENTISTS' HERALD

Тематический выпуск:

БУДУЩЕЕ СИСТЕМЫ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ.
С НАТО ИЛИ БЕЗ?
FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY SYSTEM.
WITH OR WITHOUT NATO?

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«ВЕСТНИК УЧЕНЫХ-МЕЖДУНАРОДНИКОВ»

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«Будущее системы международной безопасности. С НАТО или без?»

11-12 декабря 2019 г. состоялся двухдневный семинар «Будущее системы международной безопасности. С НАТО или без?», организованный Дипломатической академией МИД России при поддержке Министерства иностранных дел Российской Федерации и содействии Фонда поддержки публичной дипломатии имени А.М. Горчакова. Участниками мероприятия стали молодые ученые – лауреаты конкурса эссе о будущем системы безопасности.

В ходе двухдневного семинара участники провели ряд встреч и приняли участие в дискуссиях с представителями Министерства иностранных дел Российской Федерации, Министерства обороны Российской Федерации, Дипломатической академии МИД России, Фонда поддержки публичной дипломатии имени А.М. Горчакова, Института Европы РАН и Санкт-Петербургского государственного университета.

В первый день семинара перед молодыми учеными выступили проректор по научной работе Дипломатической академии МИД России О.П. Иванов, заместитель исполнительного директора Фонда поддержки публичной дипломатии имени А.М.Горчакова Р.Н.Гришенин и Директор Департамента общеевропейского сотрудничества МИД России Н.С. Кобринец. Во второй день перед лауреатами конкурса выступил заместитель Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации А.В.Грушко.

В рамках семинара участники представили свои работы и приняли участие в экспертной дискуссии о современной ситуации в области безопасности в Европе и Арктике, роли НАТО в вопросах обеспечения международной и региональной безопасности, состоянии отношений России и НАТО и перспективах их дальнейшего развития.

В специальном выпуске научного журнала «Вестник ученых-международников» публикуются научные работы лауреатов семинара.

С уважением,

Редакция Журнала

«Вестник ученых-международников»

"The Future of In ternational Security System. With or Without NATO?"

On December 11-12, 2019, a two-day seminar "The Future of the International Security System. With or without NATO?" was held, organized by the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the assistance of the A. Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund.

The event was attended by young scientists – laureates of an essay contest on the future of the security system.

During the two-day seminar, the participants held several meetings and took part in discussions with representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the A. Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the St. Petersburg State University.

On the first day of the seminar, young scientists were addressed by O. Ivanovб the Vice-Rector for Research of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and R. Kobrinets, Deputy Executive Director of the A. Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund. On the second day, A. Grushko, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, addressed the laureates of the competition.

During the seminar, the participants presented their work and took part in an expert discussion on the current security situation in Europe and the Arctic, the role of NATO in ensuring international and regional security, the state of relations between Russia and NATO, and the prospects for their further development.

In a special issue of the scientific journal "IR Scientists' Herald" published scientific articles of the laureates of the contest.

Yours faithfully,

Editorial Board

"IR Scientists' Herald"

СОДЕРЖАНИЕ

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ПРИРОДА СОВРЕМЕННЫХ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ КОНФЛИКТОВ И ПРОБЛЕМЫ ИХ МИРНОГО РАЗРЕШЕНИЯ И УРЕГУЛИРОВАНИЯ

NATURE OF CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS AND PROBLEMS OF THEIR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND SOLUTION

Аннотация: глобальные проблемы цивилизации - не простая тема, как может показаться на первый взгляд. Они появляются благодаря объективным закономерностям развития цивилизации, в ходе которых существующее мировоззрение радикально перестраивается. В этом случае сам мир претерпевает революционные изменения в планетарном масштабе. Эти изменения действительно затрагивают все основы жизни и процветания человеческой цивилизации: в нынешних условиях ни одна страна в мире не сможет избежать этих изменений или участия в процессах глобализации, регионализации и интеграции.

Abstract: the global problems of human civilization are not a simple topic as it might seem at first glance. They appear due to the objective laws of civilization development, during which the existing world view is radically

restructured. In this case, the world itself is undergoing revolutionary changes on a planetary scale. These changes really affect all the basics of life and prosperity of human civilization: under the present conditions, not a single country in the world will be able to avoid these changes or the involvement in the processes of globalization, regionalization, and integration.

Ключевые слова: НАТО, международные конфликты, мирное урегулирование, новые вызовы и угрозы.

Keywords: NATO, international conflicts, peaceful settlement, new challenges and threats.

The development of civilization, which is now on the path of planetary change, generates a set of new challenges and threats that also take on global nature under the present conditions, becoming the global challenges in the development of humanity. The effort of only developed countries is not enough to overcome these problems; combined efforts of the entire international community are required.

However, even when constantly faced with new global problems and challenges, we still remain incorrigible optimists in spite of the chaos in international relations, which some politicians call "manageable." We continue to believe that even though the world is rapidly plunging into the abyss of conflict and war, it is still changing for the better. Even today, in the minds of many citizens, there is still a myth that with the end of the COVID-19 pandemic the world finally ended its existence in the conflict paradigm and moved to a new, higher quality and level of development, characterized by reduction of conflict in all the world regions.

Yet the problems of management and resolution of international conflicts continue to apply; on the contrary, we clearly see that when the United States carried out a conscious dismantling of the Yalta-Potsdam system of the world order, it resulted in the collapse of the entire system of international security; the

world is rapidly sinking into chaos of big and small wars and ethno-political and religious conflicts.

As the war in Libya has shown and it is now demonstrated by the armed conflict in Syria, in response to increasing global leaders' struggle for power, regional conflicts can easily outgrow their initial frame and spill out into the broader impact, up to global wars.

Activities of the United States and their partners (NATO, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) for "peace enforcement" and "forcing the democracy" in different regions of the world do not only eliminate the root causes of political conflicts occurring there, but in many cases lead to the escalation and the transition to a new, more ambitious level. In the majority of countries, where the United States intervenes as a "peacemaker" of internal affairs, they place a bet and cooperate with the very political forces and regimes that are known worldwide as "terrorists" and "extremists." In Afghanistan, for example, the United States is actively collaborating with the Taliban (at the partnership level); and in the civil war in Libya, have a decisive role in the destruction of the army units loyal to Gaddafi was played by the Al-Qaeda militias standing on the edge of the blow dealt by the joint forces of NATO and the rebels. And now, at least a half of the so-called warlords of the united Syrian opposition are heads of the Al-Qaeda's fighting cells that were released from the underground where President Bashar al-Assad has put them.

We live in difficult times: the world is changing right before our eyes. The pace and speed of these changes are continuously increasing: it took Western political consultants only one year to turn a peaceful and prosperous North Africa, where some countries' standard of living (e.g., in particular, Tunisia) is almost indistinguishable from the southern departments of France, into a focus of brutal civil war, international terrorism, and radical Islam. Now the same fate awaits Syria, and then the entire Middle East, including the main irreconcilable opponent of the U.S., Iran.

Since 2011, when an armed militant group of the so-called “free opposition” began to penetrate the territory of Syria, the world is constantly balancing on the brink of another major war, which is not limited to the Middle East, Syria, and Iran: the wave will definitely reach Russia and China. Today we can say that the hour has struck: the U.S. and NATO have finished the concentration of strike force intended for Syrian invasion and its transformation into a new Iraq. Apparently, American strategists have decided that it is time to finally solve the Syrian issue: only the stubborn Bashar al-Assad is holding them back on the way to Iran, who for some reason does not give up and who did not learn anything from the example of his brother Moammar Gadhafi, who was captured and then brutally murdered. After all, it is thanks to the stubbornness of Bashar al-Assad that the substantial invasion forces are idle in Afghanistan, wasting taxpayers' money, and Iran is openly laughing at the efforts of Western countries to reformat the entire Greater Middle East.

The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, spoke publicly for the first time about the fact that Western countries apply the "elements of blackmail" towards Russia, demanding to approve the draft of the UN Security Council resolution on Syria, which Russia and China are successfully blocking: Chapter 7 of the UN Charter allows the Security Council to undertake economic, diplomatic and other sanctions in the event of threats to the peace, and if such are be enough, to proceed to armed action. The adoption of such a resolution would be very favorable to the U.S. and its allies in Europe and would finally decide the fate of Syria. However, even the lack of the resolution is not a constraint for the United States: it is enough for us to recall the war in Yugoslavia.

The world has entered a long period of global instability, where the basic form of existence of the international relations system is a "controlled chaos," and the old ways of implementing foreign policy are losing their effectiveness. In this new reality, Russia is at the intersection of the interests of the leading world powers seeking to dominate the world, such as USA, China, the Islamic world (both Sunni and Shia), etc. Although, the peace policy of Russia does not make

anybody happy. Our country has an extremely important geopolitical position in Eurasia, by the very fact of its existence, making it difficult to implement aggressive and strategic plans that create new world aggressors.

This is why today Russia is under huge external pressure from the West (U.S., NATO) in the issues with Syria and Iran, and from the East (Saudi Arabia, Japan, etc.), for whom it is vitally important that Russia does not implement its own independent foreign policy, and obediently allows to embed themselves into the wake of the western or eastern policy. In the West, we hear more and more often the opinions that 'the new democratic Russia is a non-viable state', that 'it will always stand in opposition to world politics and to a truly democratic progress', that 'for the whole of Western civilization it would have been incomparably better and more useful if Russia was divided into two dozen fiefdoms, in which democratic values would win'. Siberia with its vast resources, which Russia owns alone and does not share, in general, should be made available to the entire world (i.e. Western) civilization. These are not mere words: creation of a belt of political instability around Russia, and surrounding its borders with the global missile defense system clearly indicates that the U.S. and NATO are ready to move from words to action as soon as the right moment and the reason for the intervention come.

Under these conditions, Russia will need not only a modernized foreign policy, calibrated for the specific conditions of global development, but also a complete modernization of the existing foreign policy concepts and doctrines, principles, research and the formation of new alliances and alliances; flexible use of resources, actual and potential allies reassessment of priorities and targets and development of new methods to influence Russia's opposing alliances. This is particularly necessary, since Russia, in its position of defending peace in the Middle East, has remained essentially alone: its only ally in resisting the West's position regarding Syria is China, but it is a rather arbitrary and changeable ally. In addition, China pursues its own strategic interests in the Syrian conflict (and not only in Syrian).

We concur with those local researchers and patriots who believe that major efforts to modernize Russia's foreign policy should be aimed at supporting the process of development and foreign policy decisions by the Russian leadership and those members of the international relationships that share the position and views of the Russian Federation on the events in the world. In addition to this problem, Russia's modernized foreign policy should include mechanisms for the formation and translation of the positive image of Russia to foreign audiences, information and analytical support for the foreign policy of the country and the ongoing Russian foreign policy actions, including the state system of promotion in the Russian civil and Information Society. Only in this case, the foreign policy of Russia will unite all the progressive forces interested in the future of Russia as a great power, and will become the platform to generate innovative ideas of harmonization of international relations and global development processes, giving a new impetus to the development of the theory of international relations and domestic political science in general.

In the future, on the basis of Russian foreign policy, national culture, and ideology, an authoritative community of experts in the field of international relations and global development should be formed; such community should be represented by different actors in international relations, such as states and international organizations, as well as entities of public diplomacy. This will allow the international community to get the full unbiased coverage of world events of international significance, as well as their comprehensive scientific, analytical, and peer review; identify and explore trends of global development , and the formation of a new world order, new platform and architecture of international relations.

Contemporary modernization of political picture of the world that has captured Russia as well is characterized by three main factors: the multiplicity of conflicts, accompanied by a great variety of forms, high speed of propagation of changes through the processes of contemporary globalization, and the growing chaos in international relations. Despite the end of global confrontation, the total

number of international and domestic political conflicts continues to grow in the modern world; there are new forms (conflicts of values), little affected by the stabilizing effects of the traditional tools of diplomacy; "to replace the wars of national liberation against colonialism and neo-colonialism comes a new generation of much more dangerous conflicts between civilizations."**[8]**. In this case, international conflicts are becoming a point of intersection between interests of major world actors - Russia, the U.S., China, the EU - and at the same time the field of contact, interpenetration, and clashes of values of the world's major ideologies - Christianity, Confucianism, and Islam.

The study of the modern international conflicts, their nature and causes, and the factors affecting their regulation and resolution, has significantly moved forward in recent years. It resulted not only in a qualitative jump in the understanding of the nature and driving forces of the current conflicts, but also the change in attitude to them. It became clear that the conflicts (including political and international) have a certain function, without which the development of society is impossible. These features are equally destructive and constructive in nature: "Productivity of confrontation stems from the fact that the conflict is leading to changes, changes lead to adaptation, and adaptation leads to modern survival."**[4]**.

The modern theory of international relations comes from the basic provision stating that the conflict is not an anomaly in international relations, but one of the forms of interaction of actors during the course of which an upgrade and modernization of the political picture of the world occur.

However, the very notion of an international conflict remains largely debatable. The common criteria to clearly separate the political conflicts into international and non-international (internal) has not yet been worked out. This and other problems of classification and typology of political conflicts are associated with the complexity of the nature of the conflict that requires synthesis of different methodological approaches. Thus, the appearance of fundamental works in the Russian press should be noted, which examined international conflicts from the

positions of the various adjacent disciplines: political science **[3]**, psychology **[5]**, sociology **[1]**, ethnic conflictology **[2]**, etc. On the basis of the synthesis of different methodological approaches, new paradigms of international conflict management began to emerge, in particular cultural and **[11]** civilizational, which have received confirmation in the specific practice of international relations.

The understanding that conflict does not always mean "bad" has created a real revolution in theory of management of international processes. International conflict came to be regarded as not only an object of suppression or resolution, but also an object of external control. It became clear that the conflict "could be manageable, manageable in a way that its negative and destructive effects can be minimized, and its constructive abilities can be strengthened." **[6]**. However, the emergence of technologies such as "controlled chaos" and their distribution to the practice of international relations shows that value of peaceful conflict resolution in the practice of international relations is not yet an absolute category, the main and only purpose of the external influence conflicts. These issues were a catalyst for discussion of issues in the conflict management theory, such as the universality of values and the technologies of impact on conflicts based on them, the ability to control entire regions, immersing them in the political chaos, and etc.

Any international conflict develops on different levels. This idea became the basis for application of level-by-level analysis to modern political conflicts (including international). For the first time such analysis was proposed by K. Waltz to study the process of making political decisions. In conflictology, this approach got the expression in the form of a level diagram, in which political conflict is seen as an interaction between:

- Civilizations;
- Actors of international relations, their alliances, and coalitions;
- Government agencies of different actors, authorized to represent their interests in the conflict;
- Individual actors - government officials and persons authorized by the parties in conflict to act on their behalf and represent their national interests.

In the Western political tradition, there is a different understanding of the nature of conflicts and their management, based on the views of the leading schools of American political thought: realism (including its newest flow), liberalism (also including its latest direction), and constructivism. Representatives of all these schools agree on the fact that the conflicts are based on the unsolved fundamental contradictions; however, they show significant differences of views on which factors exactly generate this controversy.

Representatives of the school of political realism note that a mismatch of national interests of its members lies in the basis of conflicts. Willingness of different actors to build a system of national interests for other international actors in accordance with its own vector of foreign policy creates tension, which then results in a particular form of conflict interaction, called "collision of interests." The conflicts that arise as a result of such a collision of countervailing political forces have been called "conflicts of interests."

Representatives of the school of political liberalism believe that the basis of the current political conflict is a mismatch of values carried by the participants. The differences in the value systems of the conflicting parties, their complete incompatibility and the desire of individual actors to impose their values on other political parties to international relations, mostly by force, give rise to a new form of conflict interaction, known as the "clash of values." The conflicts that arise as a result of such a collision of political values and ideologies generated by the dramatic differences in the philosophical concepts and doctrines of different civilizations (Anglo-Saxon, Romano-Germanic, East Asian, Middle Eastern, etc.) are called "conflicts of interests."

Representatives of the relatively young school of political constructivism agree with neo-liberals on the opinion that at the heart of contemporary political conflict there is a mismatch of values, but claim that the values themselves are not something immutable and civilizational-specified, and may be constructed of any ideological material, on the basis of any cultural and civilizational platform, including platforms for the solution of specific foreign policy objectives. As a

result, in the real conflict, it is not the commitment to a certain set of values that has the decisive importance for the position of its members; it is with which values does the party in conflict relate (identify) itself and its foreign policy at this particular point in time.

According to constructivists, there are so many of these sets of values, and the different actors of conflict can change or modify them depending on the political situation. Even ethnicity in constructivism is presented as "a process of social construction of imagined communities, based on the belief that they are combined by essential and natural links, one type of culture and ideas, or the myth of a common origin and a common history. To what extent these features combine into a single entity called ethnicity, depends on many social factors, primarily on the demand for ethnicity, generated by era and by individuals **[15]**."

Differences in self-identification of political actors generate claims related to the division of society into "us" and "them" on the basis of belonging to a particular ethnic group, family, clan, diaspora, language group, religious denomination, etc., and that fall, according to constructivists, as the basis for modern political conflicts. Such conflicts are called "conflicts of identification."

The Anglo-Saxon classification of political conflict that divides them into three main categories - conflicts of interests, values, and identity - at first glance looks simplified and schematic. However, it really works and allows understanding the nature of the processes underlying the current conflicts at different levels of development.

The management of conflicts from the standpoint of constructivism is nothing less than a control of group behavior of their members having examined them as a social group, to which the conduct of its members regulate social laws. In contemporary sociology, group behavior is quite well understood: it is the inclusion (or entering) of the individual in the group that makes him choose a certain role, taking into account the role of other members of the group, and then playing it. Constructivists in the provisions of the theory point out that there is no difference in the laws of social role behavior in groups consisting of individual

members of society, or in groups consisting of the actors of international relations and world politics, even if these actors are the nation-states: their role behavior in a group is determined by well-known and well-studied laws of social interaction. This also applies to international conflicts: conflict interaction is based on the principles of intra-social conflict. There is a clear transfer of schemes, theories, laws, and practices of social interaction in the sphere of international relations.

There are various forms of role behavior in social groups: role of the leader, role of the slave, role of the arbitrator, role of the alpha-, beta-, gamma-members of the community, etc. Although the behavior of the person outside the group may be of any kind or at least have a multitude of variations, within the group it always corresponds to a role patterns adopted in this group and cannot be arbitrary and variable. The number of these circuits is always, of course, quantized and represents a defined set. This is precisely the nature of the social group behavior that allows successfully isolating, identifying, and classifying these patterns (sets).

Constructivists, in fact, favor the same opinions on the conduct of its actors: they call role patterns of social group behavior "cultures", their theory of "cultural drift"(when changing a behavior pattern, the actor chooses a new pattern out of a finite set of existing patterns of group behavior). This is an interpretation of the social law of change in role hierarchy of an individual within a social group, adapted to the sphere of international relations. However, it is known that in the social psychology, all the patterns of role behavior of individuals in a group, stratum or socium result from the cultural and civilizational identity.

Techniques of psychological impact on the conflict from the point of view of the constructivists are techniques of managing roles or role-playing behavior of the participants of the conflict within the group. Management of group behavior in international conflict coming from its (behavior's) social nature is certainly a progressive and innovative move, creating new opportunities for the resolution of existing and potential conflicts. Social techniques of the behavior control of actors in world politics in the conflict environment paves the way for the future, and their importance in shaping the tools of peaceful conflict resolution is comparable only

with the progress management of the perception of conflict - techniques of political marketing.

The presence of two fundamental factors that determine the foreign policy of the modern state - the interests and values - often leads to the fact that between the adherents of realism and liberalism, there is a conflict related to the fact that following only national interests or values in the foreign policy involves two fundamentally different formats of its implementation. Thus, realists believe that foreign policy must be pragmatic and aimed at obtaining specific benefits of cooperation with other states, which should be considered only to the extent it meets the national interests of their own country. For realists (including modern ones), there is the formula that "in foreign policy there are no allies and partners, only interests", which dates back to Winston Churchill.

Liberals, by contrast, argue that foreign policy should be aimed at the convergence of ideological positions of different actors, achieved by the export of liberal values. States that adopt liberal values automatically become allies, partners, and then satellites of the liberal leaders of the world. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to forget about extracting a specific short-term gain, and direct the efforts at the reformation of the political systems and regimes of the future allies on the world stage in accordance with liberal values and democratic institutions.

U.S. foreign policy towards other countries for a long time was being built in accordance with the two dominant ideological concepts, political realism and political liberalism. Both concepts, supporting and developing the idea of a global historical mission of the United States, intended to become a center of resource management of the entire democratic world, however, noticeably differ in the choice of the political trajectory of the United States towards the indicated goal, as well as the selection of the specific means, methods, and tools necessary to achieve it.

The main differences between the schools of political realism and liberalism (including the latest modifications and currents) are rooted in ideas about what factors exactly determine the foreign policy of the state at its basic, fundamental

level. If realists consider everything that happens through the prism of national interests which concurrence gives rise to cooperation, and intersection or collision - to conflicts, the liberals put values at the basis of the foreign policy of any state, arguing that the resilience and vitality of the political system depends on the credibility of its system of values, and the political influence depends on the ability to carry (export) these values into the world. In this regard, the liberals see foreign policy as a tool for the dissemination of values on other actors in international relations, and the discrepancy between the values of different actors is the true cause of international conflicts.

As P.A. Tsygankov pointed out, one of the most attractive features of the theory of political realism is the desire to justify the idea that in the basis of international policy there are objective and immutable laws of political behavior, the roots of which are to be found in human nature itself. The central concept of political realism, "interest defined in terms of power," links the existence of the laws of international relations to the need for security, prosperity, and development, which the state should defend in its foreign policy. Political realists insist on the fact that in today's world, a major feature of international politics is the constant pursuit of nation-states to maintain the status quo in the world favorable for them or to change it in their favor. In turn, this leads to a particular configuration of international relations, called the balance of power, and, consequently, to a policy aimed at maintaining this balance **[17]**.

Political realism is skeptical about the possibilities of regulating the international community on the basis of laws or moral values: the main function of international morality lies in its use it as a power tool against the potential and real enemies **[13]**.

From the point of view of the liberals, today the possibilities of great powers to use traditional power potentials in order to achieve their goals have been steadily declining. Power is becoming less used and less forced **[16]**, and national interests are losing their importance in world politics.

Many modern elements of power slip away from the public authority, leaving the interstate system with a limited in number of opportunities to have an effective influence on the processes, making resort to indirect and always costly methods of coercion **[14]**. The main regulators of international relations are the universal moral norms or values that are institutionalized in legal imperatives and become the basis for the formation of the relevant international institutions **[9]**.

The fact that the followers of the ideology of political realism are mostly members of the Republican Party, and the bearers of ideas of political liberalism are mostly Democrats leads to the fact that in the United States with its frequent change of parties in power, the content of foreign policy often changes as well: the U.S. policy aimed at protecting national interests suddenly forgets about them and starts to disseminate the universal values and export democracy, building a global society based on democratic principles of Anglo-Saxon civilization, etc. As a result of sudden and unexpected (especially for potential allies and partners of the U.S.) twists, the U.S. foreign policy does not only lose its appeal, but also creates the impression of instability, variability, and propensity for spontaneous, irrational actions.

Variability of U.S. foreign policy has become a cause of its general inefficiency in the various regions of the world, where Americans have had a good chance to gain a foothold firmly and permanently, but were unable to do so. It is this picture that has been developed with the U.S. presence in Central Asia: while the Americans were choosing between "interests" and "values" and radically changing the political course every three to four years, refusing and then returning again to already approved systems, China slowly drove them away from almost all of their entrenched positions.

In this respect, U.S. policy in Afghanistan is another typical example of conflict of interests and values, as well as the overall inconsistency and confusion generated by conflict, related to the constant fluctuations in the choice between the "national interest" and "universal values", between the rational and pragmatic approach to the problem of Afghanistan, based on the exploitation of its strategic

resources and irrational, idealistic approach, seeking to create the next democratic society in Afghanistan **[10]**.

However, it should be noted that international conflicts of a new generation are structurally more complex than their predecessors; they demonstrate the ability to grow rapidly, involve new members in the field, impacting directly on their values and socio-cultural archetypes, and quickly develop any, even minor impact up to the level of inter-civilizational conflict. Contemporary conflicts of values are almost impervious to the efforts of the international community in their foreign pacification: today's existing concepts, doctrines, and instruments of peacekeeping activities are focused primarily on traditional forms of conflict, built on the clash of interests of nation-states, and consider the process of conflict resolution as a result of the interaction of international institutions, whose real ability to settle international conflicts today is increasingly being questioned.

Evolution of the conflicts themselves is not standing still: modern conflicts continuously develop new forms of conflict interaction; they are more socially dangerous, but at the same time, they are more manageable. In the evolution of international conflicts, a new phase of the inter-civilization emerges. In this phase, the consolidation of forces, capabilities and resources of its members is based on the principle of belonging to a particular culture or civilization, promoting its value system, which allows uniting and mobilizing considerable human and material resources, and raising the status of local conflicts to the inter-civilizational level.

Concept of collision of civilizations is a mechanism to mobilize resources of the new generation: it exceeds the capabilities of the nation-state ideology capable of participating in the conflict to mobilize (by nationality) resources of a single state and its political allies. In the conflicts of a new generation, the resource mobilization occurs on the mental and value level that brings together cross-border and multinational masses of people belonging to a common civilization paradigm or cultural tradition.

Throughout the world, the inter-civilizational conflicts in international practice replace traditional forms of conflict, built on the clash of interests of

nation-states (the so-called institutional conflicts). This leads to the fact that instead of institutional conflict resolution, the cultural and civilizational model of the management based on the technologies of information and psychological impact on the system of values and worldview of the conflicting parties will come. There are four of these models in the world today: the Anglo-Saxon, East Asian, Middle Eastern, and Romano-Germanic.

Anglo-Saxon model sees the conflict resolution in a complete, forced transformation of the political systems of the conflicting parties, or rather its opponent, which should take the political norms and standards of the Anglo-Saxon civilization ("democratic institutions"). Traditionally, the Anglo-Saxons use the methods of coercive pressure ("peace enforcement", "humanitarian intervention", "fight against terrorism"), as well as the methods of non-violent action ("soft power", "color revolutions," "psychological war"). The Anglo-Saxon model is based on the outlook of the Protestant ideology and ethics of success, as well as the utility of the final result.

East Asian model assumes the goal of conflict resolution in a gradual, long-term embedding (integration) of political systems and values of the conflicting parties, opponents, in its own system of political relations (for example, the Taiwan problem, "the return" of Hong Kong: “one country - two systems”), gradually dissolving in its system the national identity of political systems of the weaker participants. As a result of long-term assimilation (Manchus, the Dingling - Tashtyk culture, the other "barbarians"), the extinction of entire peoples and ethnic groups in China is known.

Middle Eastern (Islamic) *model* sees the conflict resolution process in the transference, projection of the historical traditional mechanisms in Islam onto the conflict zones by extending the range of the Islamic world and the spread of its influence on the social and political relations, including ideology. The division of the world along religious lines revives the spirit of the religious wars of jihad, which includes both peaceful means of regulating international conflict and armed

struggle for the faith. In the Shiite branch of Islam, dominant in Iran, there is a general lack of calls for jihad against the "infidels."

Romano-Germanic model is based on its civilizational, political ethics, burdened by stereotypes, a set of "common" or mandatory ethical ideas that do not always coincide with the views other civilizations. Thus, for example, the dialogues with the Chinese are difficult for the French and the Germans. Romano-Germanic model assumes that the process of resolving the conflict situation is to change the views of the conflict participants mainly through acceptance of the ethical norms and stereotypes established in this civilization. This model of the psychological impact on the conflicts does not set the goal to change the political system of its members by direct intervention, but seeks to direct awareness of the political elites in power - parties to the conflict, as well as the consciousness of the different sections of the local population and the international community, encouraging them to perceive the conflict according to the proposed image of conflict, i.e. to look at the conflict through the eyes of the European community **[12]**.

Each of the world's cultural and civilizational models of conflict management aims to transform the political system involved in the conflict, in accordance with its own view of the world and values. National and state principles of conflict resolution are gradually fading into the past; the general decline of the institutional system of conflict management emphasizes the crisis of the UN as the main institution of the peacekeeping.

Color revolutions are a typical example of the Anglo-Saxon approach to the management of international conflict. In world politics, technology of color revolutions is a type of modern technology of informational and psychological management of international conflict. For successful implementation, the country has to be in a state of political instability: crisis of power has to be present, even better, if one or more of the local armed conflicts develop in the country, or the country is involved in a major international conflict. In other words, there must be

the object of influence - political conflict in any phase of development. If the government is stable and there is no conflict, it needs to be created first.

Modern color revolutions have a high degree of adaptability and almost theatrical level of drama, which aims to give out what is happening for the spontaneous and natural manifestation of the will of the people that all of a sudden decided to reclaim the right to govern their own country. Despite the significant differences of the states, in which they break out (in the geopolitical, social, economic terms and the international situation), they all fit into the same organizational scheme, which implies a pattern of organization according to a model of a youth protest movement, transforming it into a political crowd and using this forces against the government as an instrument of political blackmail.

Technology of color revolutions is continuously evolving. Thus, in the early 2000s if the goal of the color revolutions was to organize a coup in one of the countries (Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, etc.), now the goal of the color revolutions becomes the control of political regimes across entire regions - the Middle East , the whole of Central Asia, and North Africa, etc. The extent and danger of technology of color revolutions is continuously increasing, and there are new methods and techniques of impact on traditional societies of the East in their structure.

The latest example of evolutionary breakthrough in the Anglo-Saxon technologies of the organizations of color revolutions is the color revolutions in the Middle East and North Africa (December 2010 - present time), better known under the name of the "Arab Spring revolutions," in which to the classical techniques of "soft power" and the formation of a political crowd they added the technology of the "controlled chaos" (for the purpose of " atomization "of traditional Eastern societies to free their members from the protection provided by these companies and make them more susceptible to external control action) and a special iterative scheme that, with a quick change of objects of exposure, (sequential repetition of the same patterns of revolutions in the countries belonging to the same cultural and civilizational community) allows creating an effective feedback mechanism,

designed to track bugs, errors and inconsistencies and its timely address, making the technology itself ever more perfect with the transition from one color revolution to another. After passing such a break-in in Arab countries of Africa and the Middle East, particularly in the conditions of the Syrian revolution, these technologies will reach the level of excellence that will enable them to be applied to the most sophisticated and sustainable project, Iran.

Contemporary international conflicts representing a collision between the systems of values of different world civilizations are the "melting pot" of the existing doctrines and centers of political modernization. Having become regulated as a result of special political technology, such conflicts become tools of political modernization of the system of international relations, which evolution can be directed in a particular course. Political modernization can be controlled through managing of international conflicts. For the leading world powers striving for global leadership, it is more profitable today to make an international conflict manageable and then use it to their advantage, than promote its peaceful resolution. That is why the ideology of external conflict management is now actively developing in all the world leaders, and they put the international conflict management concepts to the forefront of peacekeeping.

Along with the dominance of the ideology of the inter-civilizational and cultural confrontation in modern international conflicts, there is a change of goal-setting in peacekeeping operations: instead of the object that needs to be "inclined" or "forced" to peace, international conflicts are coming to be seen as objects of external political control, rather than being a direct and speedy resolution. Peaceful conflict in contemporary global politics is not interesting and not beneficial to anyone (except civilians): in a peaceful phase it cannot provide a geopolitical advantage in the region to none of the great powers. The value of "peaceful resolution" fades into the background and is replaced with new reference values - the "political necessity" and "political expediency", promoted by the Western (mainly Anglo-Saxon) ideology and political propaganda **[7]**.

However, change in the basic values and the very nature of goal-setting in modern operations for the settlement of conflicts leads to the accumulation of the conflict potential, encouraging a multiplicity of conflicts, their mass freezing as a result of the modern "peace" activities and direct danger of cumulative effects - simultaneous spontaneous thawing of these conflicts in the future.

This situation demands the international community to not only find new approaches and ways of influence over conflicts, but also form new paradigms of conflict management. The concepts and models of conflict management through technology information and psychological impact, based on the cultural and civilizational values and traditions become such a paradigm of today. These values noticeably differ in members of the different civilizations, even if we compare the Anglo-Saxon countries (U.S., UK), and Romano-Germanic countries of the world (Western Europe), belonging to one of the Western cultural tradition. Thus, it is least premature to talk about the universality of values today. Apart from the Anglo-Saxon model of conflict management, the leading countries of Western Europe (Germany, France), Asia-Pacific (China, Vietnam) and the Middle East (the Islamic world) offer their cultural and civilization and nation-state models. Today, all of these models are still in the stage of conflict-free coexistence and even in some cases complement each other. However, this temporary balance of power may change at any time.

Each of the four dominant models of conflict management in today's world (Anglo-Saxon, East Asian, Middle Eastern and Romano-Germanic) aims to transform the system of values involved in the conflict, in accordance with their own system of values, considered by the representative of this model to be the best and the most perfect. None of them provide freedom of choice for the parties of the conflict and the principle of competition among the models themselves in the fight for the right to resolve the conflict: all deals are exclusively about the civilizing mission and governance “in the dark.” Eventually, it will inevitably lead to fierce competition between models and attention diversion from the actual problem of the peaceful resolution of conflicts.

In the background of this rivalry, the existing global models of conflict management shall accept a new component providing for the participants of conflicts the voluntary choice between the models based on the best alternative and the guarantees of the right of choice. A Russian civilizational model can become such a model, because the principles of alterity are close to the Russian practice of resolving political conflicts.

Russia today returned to world politics as a key player and it is more than ever interested in strengthening its position in the strategically important regions of the globe, where the most dangerous international conflicts occur. Russia's return to the area in the form of a peacemaker is not just a question of economic feasibility, but also the international prestige. In addition, Russia has a vast and varied experience of peacekeeping in the CIS, in demand at present.

However, apart from experience, a key factor of the success of Russia in the management of international conflict is its own cultural and civilizational model based on national technology of impact on the value system of the conflicting parties. Only the production of its own model of conflict management will allow Russia to take its rightful place among the already firmly established foreign players in this field, each of whom is based on his own value, cultural and civilizational paradigm in the management of international conflict. Meanwhile, the Russian model should not duplicate the existing Western or Eastern counterparts, and provide the participants of the conflicts with the decent and the best alternative.

Unlike the leading Euro-Atlantic models (Anglo-Saxon and Romano-Germanic), Russia's cultural and civilizational model of conflict management considers the process of psychological impact on conflict as a civilizing process of modernization of the existing world view. The conflicts within the Russian concept are perceived not only as civilizational faults and collision points, points of antagonism of different civilizations, but also as "melting pots" for ideological concepts that claim to control the modern world; as a media reason for volley emissions onto the target audience and retention of values and attitudes of the

Russian national model in their minds, and the introduction of new forms and practices of social and political behavior in world politics.

The main difference from the Anglo-Saxon model is that the Russian model has its own value vision of a peaceful resolution of international conflicts, acting as the best alternative in the particular circumstances. The Russian model does not impose its own outlook and aims to ensure that the parties in the conflict made a conscious choice in favor of the Russian model and its value system by themselves, voluntarily and without coercion. This practice is justified in the near-term and long-term development of international relations: "the democratic templates" of the political behavior of the Anglo-Saxons, forcibly imposed on the parties in the conflict, need constant external structural support and cease to function as soon as the power factor disappears. Hence, their effect is short-lived and cannot qualitatively change the situation of conflict or maintain these changes for a long time.

The main distinction from the Romano-Germanic model is that the Russian model sees the resolution of conflicts in the political modernization of the entire system of international relations at the regional and global levels. In contrast, the Romano-Germanic model operates with the image and perception of the conflict in the eyes of its participants, leading actors of international relations and international community, while achieving concrete results, which, however, do not lead to revolutionary processes of political modernization in the system of international relations in general.

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РИТОРИКА ОТНОШЕНИЯ НАТО К РОССИИ: ПОВЕСТВОВАНИЕ ОБ ИСТИНЕ И ЛЖИ

NATO'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS RUSSIA THROUGH RHETORIC: A NARRATIVE OF TRUTH AND LIES

Аннотация: в статье рассматриваются агрессивная риторика и необоснованные обвинения, которые НАТО использует для создания негативного имиджа России и расширения предрассудков. Анализ проводится через исторические изменения и показывает антагонистическую природу, вплетенную в риторику.

Abstract: the paper contemplates aggressive rhetoric and groundless allegations employed by NATO to create a negative image of Russia and stir up prejudice. It scrutinizes them through historic changes and shows the antagonistic nature interwoven into the bombastic narrative.

Ключевые слова: напыщенный рассказ, разжигание предубеждений, негативное изображение, агрессивная риторика.

Keywords: bombastic narrative, stirring up prejudice, negative image, aggressive rhetoric.

In these volatile and uncertain times, evidence-based insights are more crucial than ever to inform complex decisions. They are also needed to challenge the continued public mistrust of information and misinterpretation of facts. Ever since NATO was formed, its narrative describing the USSR and its policy has been almost unchangeable in its context though it has adjusted to current situations and has been partially dissolved by periodical expressions of willingness to cooperate.

In 1954, when the United States and the Soviet Union were settling into a pattern of Cold War hostilities, Moscow proposed joining the NATO alliance on March 31st of that year. What was the pretext under which NATO rejected the Soviet proposal? The organization turned it down on the grounds that the USSR's membership of the organization would be incompatible with its "democratic and defensive aims". Hence, it followed that the Soviet Union was "assertive" in its policy to maintain both its political and military influence over Eastern Europe.

The good intentions of NATO's founders looked more like wishful thinking as most background sources explained more or less in a similar way that NATO was built "on the premise of being able to outlast the Soviet Union in the aftermath of a catastrophic war, with detailed plans for the military to prop civil societies recovering from the brink of destruction". Since the end of WWII, the Soviet Union (now the Russian Federation) has been perceived as simply too powerful to resist; thus, NATO members' borders and their "democratic freedoms" were and are now to be safeguarded.

Suffice it to mention that NATO advocates chanted George Frost Kennan's policy of "containment of Soviet expansion" during the Cold War as it was ideally in tune with the organization's basic premise of serving as a deterrent against

“Soviet aggression” on the continent and providing collective security against the Soviet Union. In his "Long Telegram" from Moscow during 1946 and subsequent 1947 article, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” George F. Kennan, the apologist of the Cold War, argued that the Soviet regime was inherently “expansionist” and that its influence had to be "contained" in areas of vital strategic importance to NATO members. It should be noted, though, that 40 years later he cast doubt upon whether “this was what we had really wanted when we set out, more than forty years before, to wage a Cold War”).

Even before the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4th, 1949, objective and subjective factors had determined the negative attitude of the USSR, and its creation was seen as a direct attack on the agreements reached between the USSR, the USA and Britain during the Second World War. Moreover, the military-political Association was presented as “a specially created tool for unleashing new military conflicts”, the prospect of which caused the Soviet people, who had borne all the hardships of the past war on their shoulders, to adopt a uniquely negative attitude. Based on these sentiments, the Soviet periodical press of the 1940s played a fundamental role in the process of constructing a negative image of NATO.

In all fairness, though, the Soviet Union duly responded to NATO by waging a responsive ideological war. Here is an extract from the periodical of the newspaper Pravda (August 8th, 1965): “Recently international tension has greatly increased. Under the cover of nonsense about their “special duties” and “special responsibility” to the so-called free world, the ruling circles of NATO are stepping up the arms race and carrying out acts of aggression in various parts of the world. Having assumed the functions of world gendarme, they are trying – by means of the “export of counter-revolution” – to stifle the liberation movement of the people. As a result, peace and vital interests of the people stand in grave jeopardy….. The Soviet Union has always been the main obstacle in the way of the fulfillment of world imperialism’s far-reaching military and political designs.”

The wording of the statements accounted for the Soviet foreign policy that was governed by inertia and unquestioned traditional dogmas then and up to the mid-1980s. Later, in the time of Perestroika, Soviet international behavior was sharply reversed and appreciated by the West as it represented "a realistic, flexible and effective vehicle for exploring and reading the intentions of the current leaders of the Soviet Union towards European security".

It is therefore safe to say that the spiral of confrontation was broken by the development of perestroika (literally, restructuring) in the Soviet Union. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR started a zigzag process of major political and economic reform. Moscow also drastically changed its foreign policy, trying to bring the Cold War to an end. However, Western politicians still insist that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization should have been credited with bringing a peaceful end to the Cold War and preventing conflict in the seven decades since its founding. As it was disputable to whom the change in the relations after the Cold War should be attributed, the connection between the two rivals moved gradually from confrontation to relationship, and the tensions slightly deescalated. Namely, there followed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in 1987, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (the CFE Treaty), concluded in 1990, then the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1), signed in 1991.

In fact, by 1997 these relations had become productive and cordial. Regarding his 11th meeting with President Clinton, President Yeltsin said, "We have a vast area of congruent interests. Chief among these is the stability in the international situation. We want to do away with the past mistrust and animosity". But what happened that led Russia to pass a new national security concept just three years later in 2000 that affirmed Russia's commitment to dealing with "domination by developed Western countries"? The answer lies in Yugoslavia: NATO's unprecedented bombing of Yugoslavia represented a drastic use of military force that Russia saw as "contrary to international law". For Russian people who reminisced about the powerful Soviet Union that they grew up in, an

attack on Serbia was an attack on a close ally. “Our Western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by international law … but by the rule of the gun,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said in a 2014 speech after the Crimea joined Russia. “They have come to believe they can decide the destinies of the world. This happened in Yugoslavia; we remember 1999 very well”.

In spite of this fact, there was another attempt to improve NATO-Russian relations: the NATO-Russia Council was established in 2002 as “a unique mechanism for consultation, consensus building, cooperation, joint decision-making and joint action, built on the principles of equality and consensus. The NRC member states were committed to working as twenty-nine equal partners in order to fulfill the tremendous potential of the NATO-Russia Council through the continued development of their political dialogue and practical cooperation based on their shared interests. It symbolized the genuine efforts which NATO and Russia had made since the end of the Cold War to understand each other better and to work together on a new stage of cooperation towards a true strategic partnership as stated in the Joint NATO - Russia Council Statement of the Lisbon NRC Summit. Both sides were sure that the Council would contribute to “mutual understanding and help to broaden and deepen NATO-Russia dialogue and practical cooperation”. Both sides recognized that the dialogue and cooperation strengthened in 2002 with the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council “served as a forum for consultation on current security issues and directed practical cooperation in a wide range of areas”.

Nowadays, NATO alleges that for more than two decades, it has worked to build a partnership with Russia, developing dialogue and practical cooperation in areas of common interest. Why then, have relations between NATO and the Kremlin now reached “a dangerously abrasive stage, and [are] the existing threat-reduction arrangements and confidence-building mechanisms with Russia…not working”? “Russia and NATO are talking past each other and substantive dialogue is not possible under current conditions”, the NATO-oriented global security

experts insist. They relate this claim first to Russia's "disproportionate military action" in Georgia in August 2008 that led to the suspension of formal meetings of the NRC and cooperation in some areas. The cooperation was discontinued in 2014 in response to Russia's so called "military intervention" in Ukraine (including the Crimea and Eastern Ukraine) although the Russian government has been trying ever since to prove the legality of its actions. The Allies still condemn this Russian policy in the strongest terms, but channels of political and military communication remain open "to exchang[ing] information on issues of concern, reduc[ing] misunderstandings and increase[ing] predictability".

Today NATO has "concerns" about Russia's "destabilizing actions and policies that go beyond Ukraine" and include "provocative military activities" near NATO's borders stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. They blame Russia for "irresponsible and aggressive nuclear rhetoric, military posture and underlying posture and other "clear breaches of international norms". Moreover, Western military analysts raised concerns about the potential for "Russian aggression" in the Baltic states in 2017. Given Russian military capabilities in the Baltic region, there was significant concern that Russia's September 2017 Zapad military exercise could be the precursor to an attack on the Baltic states. Nevertheless, the exercise went ahead, and Russian troops appeared to have returned.

The analysts who warned of "a potential Russian attack" in the Baltics recognized that an invasion was unlikely. Still, they argued that NATO should increase its posture in the region because Russia's intentions were "uncertain, given its interests in the region". Even if Russia did not seek to occupy the Baltic states, they say that Russia could take military action against them with the objective of "undermining the NATO alliance". Indeed, in reviewing the Russian strategic literature, another recent RAND report found "no serious discussion of the strategic value of retaking part or all of the Baltic States, either for their intrinsic value or as a way of weakening NATO" as Russia sees the Baltic states as foreign and fully incorporated into NATO.

In turn, Russia claims that NATO is conducting a strategy of encirclement and interprets this as a "fundamental threat" to its own interests. Moscow has always viewed NATO's post–Cold War expansion into Central and Eastern Europe with great concern. Many current and former Russian leaders believe the alliance's inroads into the former Soviet sphere are a betrayal of alleged U.S. guarantees to not expand eastward after Germany's reunification in 1990 although some U.S. officials involved in these discussions dispute the pledge.

This relationship breakdown, however, is not due to a collapse of dialogue between NATO and Russia, and a greater volume of dialogue will not improve relations. Instead, there has long been a problem with the dialogue itself: a change in its substance is necessary. As both Western and Russian political analysts stress, the dialogue should start by exploring the sources of antagonism as a premise to improving relations. This can remove the tendency of either side to be surprised when they encounter the other's red lines or face irreconcilable foreign policy perceptions. It will not solve the differences themselves, but it will help to see things more clearly.

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ВОЕННЫЕ КАМПАНИИ НАТО В РЕГИОНЕ БЛИЖНЕГО ВОСТОКА И СЕВЕРНОЙ АФРИКИ: ИРАК, ЛИВИЯ И СИРИЯ

NATO INTERVENTION POLICY IN THE MENA REGION: IRAQ, LIBYA AND SYRIA

Аннотация: статья посвящена анализу деятельности Североатлантического альянса в 21 веке. Автор анализирует трансформацию подхода к политике вмешательства во внутренние дела других стран вне зоны ответственности НАТО в условиях необходимости переориентации деятельности блока после окончания "холодной войны". Проведен сравнительный анализ участия альянса в трех конфликтах в Северной Африке и на Ближнем Востоке: в Ираке, в Ливии и в Сирии.

Abstract: The article analyzes the activities of the North Atlantic Alliance in the 21st century. The author analyzes the transformation of the approach to the policy of interference in the internal affairs of other countries outside the NATO area of responsibility, in the context of the need to reorient the activities of the bloc after the end of the Cold War. A comparative analysis is conducted of the

alliance's participation in three conflicts in Middle East and North Africa region: in Iraq, in Libya and in Syria.

Ключевые слова: НАТО, международная безопасность, терроризм, Ирак, Ливия, Сирия, США, Европа, миграция.

Keywords: NATO, international security, terrorism, Iraq, Libya, Syria, USA, Europe, migration.

The North Atlantic Alliance is the most famous military-political bloc of our time. After the end of the Cold War, NATO was confronted with the need to find a new "goal of existence." The fight against terrorism and ensuring international security began to be positioned as such goals. In this article, we will consider the main results of the three crises of the Middle East and North Africa, in which the Alliance participated in one way or another.

Iraq War 2003

U.S. policy toward the Middle East after the September 11, 2001 attacks was different from previous years. The installation of "oil and stability at all costs" was supplemented by another principle - ensuring the selectivity and security of the only remaining superpower.

The new aggressive U.S. policy, made possible only because of the lack of balance of power in international relations, was directly related to the Middle East - in 2003, when the Iraq war began. According to U.S. President George W. Bush "[America] decisively attacks terrorist organizations, weakening them, but not yet defeating them; [America] joined in the struggle of the Afghan people against the Taliban; [America] has concentrated the world's attention on the proliferation of deadly weapons; [America] supports the spread of democracy in the Greater Middle East; and [America] leads an international coalition to overthrow the dictatorial regime in Iraq" **[14**, p.1**]**.

According to some scholars, it is NATO that allows the United States to strengthen and legitimize its foreign policy **[6**, p. 408**]**. In summary, we can say that transferring responsibility to other countries to manage the risks of international security and promote its values allows the United States to maintain its goals and position of superiority in international relations.

After the September 11 attacks, NATO's place in U.S. foreign policy began to change although, in the beginning, the Alliance was determined to accept its underlying goal and provide the United States with help and support.

Although NATO resorted to Article 5 in Afghanistan for the first time in its history, the United States acted there alone, and this speaks not only of "American power but also of the gap between the military potential of the United States and any other country or group of countries" **[5**, p. 82**]**. The USA worried that "NATO [would] become a kind of E.U. – a forum where standards and policies are discussed and agreed upon, but no action is taken" **[5**, p. 95**]**.

Meanwhile, the Alliance quickly agreed to all U.S. requests to support their mission in Afghanistan, which included full access to their ports, airfields, and other NATO bases, the use of early warning radars, the withdrawal of all U.S. units from the NATO mission in the Balkans, etc. **[5**, p. 113**]**.

Soon, the United States became convinced that it was not able to cope alone with all the negative consequences of the events of September 11. Gradually, the United States came to an increasing understanding of their need for the Alliance to support U.S. actions need to support their actions by the Alliance. This understanding was continuously accompanied by discussions about U.S. influence on NATO and vice versa, about the Alliance and America's policies in the Middle East, and about the future of the Alliance as a whole. They were held not only among the officials of the bloc but also among analysts around the world.

For Europeans, any involvement outside NATO's area of responsibility is a controversial issue, and most European allies believe that terrorism should not be suppressed by military means but by eliminating the causes of its occurrence **[8**, p.

101**]**. For the Bush administration, Islam became an abstraction that was politically useful in the global war with terror **[10**, p. 163**]**.

The Middle East is far away from the United States, and therefore it was convenient to transfer all its problems there. Nevertheless, for Europe, this is the near abroad, and the American strategy of global confrontation with Islam is not suitable for Europe.

NATO's direct involvement in resolving crises in the Middle East after September 11 is associated with the Alliance's participation in the Iraq war, and, more importantly, was its only supporting role. In other words, NATO did not take responsibility for any direct military mission in this crisis.

The officials of the European allied countries were convinced that NATO, relying on soft security mechanisms, should adhere to just such a role. This was due to the fears of the European establishment that causing negative consequences in such a complex region would affect the immediate security of European countries.

The 2003 Iraq war was a test of the strength of the North Atlantic Alliance and its global politics. For example, L. Kaplan, one of the leading U.S. experts on NATO, argued that "the Iraq crisis can be imagined as a mountain, upon encountering which, NATO can split into two or fall apart altogether" **[11**, p. 145**]**.

Without exaggeration, the future of the Alliance at that time became a matter of much debate, especially in Europe. The conflicting views on the legality and necessity of the war in Iraq led to a complete split between the allies, which affected the inability of the North Atlantic Council to reach consensus at the request of the United States to support their actions. In addition, in March 2003, Belgium, France and Germany vetoed the possibility of military defense of the territory of another ally, Turkey, in the event of the development of military operations in Iraq. Some European allies, including France and Germany, were determined to prevent NATO from participating in the war because, in their opinion, it was illegal from the standpoint of international law. They also pointed out that in this aggressive war that the United States had with the aim of changing

the regime in Iraq in violation of international law, the defense alliance could do nothing to help. Moreover, it violated the entire decision-making procedure of its Council.

For example, loss of solidarity within the Alliance led U.S. Secretary of Defense D. Rumsfeld to threaten to relocate NATO headquarters from Brussels if Belgium did not agree to repeal the law allowing it to prosecute cases of genocide, war crimes or human rights violations. The Belgian Parliament amended the law to make it applicable only if the victims or criminals were citizens of that country. However, criminal cases had already been opened against U.S. President George W. Bush, British Prime Minister T. Blair, US Secretary of State C. Powell, General T. Franks, and U.S. Secretary of Defense D. Rumsfeld concerning the war in Iraq.

The rift in relations between the Allies that arose as a result of the war in Iraq and other manifestations of the unilateral actions of the neo-conservative U.S. administration turned out to be a severe challenge for the Alliance, especially because of the two private parties conducting exactly the opposite policy. The first was the axis France-Germany, which intended to create an independent Common Security Policy and the foreign policy of Europe despite the opposition of Great Britain and other U.S.-friendly "new" European countries. The second was Washington, which was ready to compromise the interests of the Allies and the entire Alliance to create ad-hoc coalitions with which it could pursue any policy without reaching the necessary consensus, which had always been a necessary condition for the organization's actions.

Meanwhile, the U.S. still managed to prevent the negative consequences of the Iraq crisis for the Alliance. Among the possible reasons for this was the search for international legitimacy of the occupation of Iraq. The United States was able to successfully persuade some European allies to participate in the operation in Iraq and deal with the split that was formed in the Alliance.

Moreover, both the Allied officials and the NATO Secretary-General announced that the countries agreed not to attach importance to their disagreements on the Iraq crisis and to "move on". As evidence of this, in a

declaration following the Istanbul summit in 2004, the Alliance announced its decision to introduce a multinational corps of stabilization forces in central Iraq **[9]**. It was to provide training for the new Iraqi security forces. However, the security of the NATO corps itself fell on the shoulders of the U.S. military.

If the Iraq crisis showed something significant, it was a confirmation that the United States cannot use NATO when and where it wants to achieve its goals in the Middle East. On the contrary, this proves that the European allies, or at least some of them, can impede the use of the Alliance by the United States as soon as they consider that this is not consistent with their vision and their interests.

The United States unsuccessfully tried to drag the North Atlantic Alliance into the midst of the crisis, but the European allies warned such a development of events and offered only modest and symbolic participation of NATO. Therefore, the role of NATO in Iraq reflects a certain restoration of solidarity between the allies.

Uprising in Libya

NATO launched an operation in Libya on March 27, 2011, and Operation "Unified Protector" became the Alliance's first military intervention in the Arab World.

First of all, it should be noted that partnerships have never linked NATO and Libya. For all the importance of the country in ensuring regional stability, none of the parties tried to make contact. About 20 years ago, Professor of the University of Milan K.M. Santoro wrote the book "Risks from the South", where he warned about the central role of Libya in ensuring the stability of North Africa and the countries of Southern Europe. It is also necessary to point to the policy of M. Gaddafi on the manipulation of migration flows, the sponsorship of terrorism, and economic blackmail.

Following the mass protests of the population in Benghazi in February 2011, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, which called on the International Criminal Court to begin investigating the situation in Libya. On March 17, 2011, the U.N. Security Council issued Resolution 1973, which

authorized the Member States, acting independently or through regional organizations, “to take all necessary measures to protect civilians from the threat” **[15]**. The resolution thus envisaged the introduction of a no-fly zone, enforcement of the arms embargo, flight ban, and freezing of assets.

Following the decision of March 27, NATO immediately contacted partners through official channels through partnership programs and informal communication means, with the help of official representatives to NATO and ambassadors of member countries.

The Alliance operation has demonstrated progress in cooperation between NATO and international and regional organizations.

Within a few days after U.N. Resolution 1973, the NATO Secretary-General was able not only to convene partners for the operation in Libya but also to establish contacts at the highest level with the U.N. and its specialized agencies, such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, E.U., LAS, The African Union, GCC, and others. He called on "all actors to participate in a concerted effort, based on a common sense of responsibility, openness, and determination, taking into account strengths, mandate, role, and independence in the decision-making of each of them” **[15**, par. 8**]**.

Furthermore, on March 24, NATO established a no-fly zone over Libya, banning all flights over the country in order to prevent government aircrafts from attacking the opposition. Moreover, on March 27, NATO took full control of the military operation in Libya, which France, Great Britain, and the United States had been conducting independently for several days.

The conditions for the intervention were favorable for NATO - there was both a legal and political context. Firstly, there was an internationally recognized humanitarian disaster, which was the result of an attempt to forcefully disperse the demonstrators by Colonel M. Gaddafi. Secondly, the League of the Arab States, which had already suspended Libya's membership by that time, called on the international community to intervene to protect civilians. And thirdly, the LAS position was a "green light" for the U.N. Security Council to adopt a resolution.

Of course, the Alliance would not have decided on such an operation without broad regional support. In addition to such a fruitful context, the agreement of the four Arab partner countries of NATO - Qatar, Jordan, Morocco and the UAE to participate in the campaign in Libya, as well as the U.S. rejection of its leading role in this operation, made the operation legitimate in the perception of the international community.

NATO officials were convinced that the events confirmed the seriousness of the Alliance's long-term commitment to its partners and their relevance to NATO operations. Most of all, the experience of Operation "Uniform Protector" proved that at the moment, the Alliance was not able to conduct large-scale campaigns without the participation of partners. The Libyan campaign of NATO, despite its relatively stable legal and political basis, has faced significant challenges to internal schism and external pressure.

Since the start of discussions about a possible operation in Libya, differences in approaches and political interests of some allies, namely France, Germany and Turkey, could not escape the attention of the press **[2; 13]**. Solidarity regarding the operation was called into question during the summit of the Alliance's defense ministers in June 2011 although consensus was reached on the continuation of the course of action until the NATO goals were achieved. Shortly after this meeting, Italian Foreign Minister F. Frattini called for an immediate halt to the campaign due to a large number of civilian casualties caused by the Alliance's airstrikes **[3]**. Thus, the consensus within the Alliance was tested continuously for strength but maintained until the public of the bloc's member countries supported the allied military operation against the forces of M. Gaddafi **[7]**. In Italy, public opinion, most of all, did not support the hostilities in Libya, and therefore, senior officials of the country released official statements. On the contrary, France, despite internal opposition and alleged ties between the President and M. Gaddafi, took the lead in the campaign, which was consistent with the ambitions of President N. Sarkozy to look like a strong political leader ahead of the 2012 presidential election.

The African and Arab allies of NATO took different approaches. The Gulf countries considered the crisis in Libya to be an "Arab" issue, not an African one. In contrast, the position of the African Union was precisely the opposite – it stated that NATO had defied the “road map” upon which the Union had elaborated.

Due to the reluctance to engage NATO in another protracted campaign to restore statehood in the Middle East, at the summit of the Alliance's defense ministers in June 2011, the Alliance's Secretary-General called on the entire international community, the Libyan Contact Group, and other civic organizations for unified transition assistance in Libya.

Gaddafi's regime fell after only seven months. The mission ended on October 31, 2011. NATO's refusal to participate in the post-crisis settlement in Libya and the inability of the Libyan Contact Group to develop a unified political solution that would be recognized by the U.N. Security Council and the international community created a "vacuum of responsibility" in Libya and pointed to the fact that it has been left unchecked since the withdrawal of NATO forces. For eight years after the overthrow of the regime of M. Gaddafi, Libya was not able to establish the basic security environment necessary for political reforms and the restoration of statehood.

Experts agree that “today Libya is in the full sense a disintegrated state in which there is no functioning political and social structure, and whose internal fragmentation is extreme and multidimensional, even by modern Middle Eastern and African standards” **[1**, p.1**]**.

Libya is one of the most militarized countries in the world. In a state with a population of 6 million people, about 20 million weapons are in circulation **[11]**. M. Gaddafi’s looting of the arsenals of armaments has had an impact on the whole of Africa, sponsoring weapons of all radical groups, not only in the border countries but also in Nigeria, Cameroon and the Central African Republic. Libya has become a source of the spread of terrorism and extremism throughout the African continent. That is why the growing crisis in Libya is a constant concern for regional countries and the vast international community.

NATO's intervention in Libya has sparked much controversy and has become the subject of opposing assessments. While many analysts, and NATO itself, see Operation "Unified Protector" in Libya as an undeniable success and even as a template for future alliance operations, others accuse NATO of self-serving use of the U.N. mandate to assist in regime change. African leaders, in particular, accused NATO of completely ignoring the Road Map for Libya. Moreover, an assessment of NATO's active mission in Libya inevitably leads to comparisons with the situation in Syria, which is also in a state of a humanitarian catastrophe.

It should be noted that the current chaos and instability in Libya is associated precisely with the failure of the NATO campaign. Although they are not directly related, it was NATO's refusal to participate in the post-crisis restoration of statehood in the country that led to general destabilization. NATO declared the operation successful because even with the protracted nature of the campaign, it was relatively inexpensive compared to previous operations of the Alliance and did not result in casualties of those within the Alliance.

These unforeseen consequences also influenced the discrediting of NATO as a capable security provider. Moreover, even these consequences that the operation in Libya has on the image of NATO will not be evaluated in any way if NATO does dare to participate in the settlement of the conflict in Syria.

NATO's distance from participating in the regional politics of the Mediterranean and the Middle East after the operation in Libya, along with declarations of the need to develop ties in M.D. and ICI, sounds like a paradox. The history of its operations has mainly ensured NATO's legitimacy to its partners in the region as a "security provider." In such a situation, it is difficult to understand how NATO will be able to restore its reputation in the region and maintain its place as a legitimate actor in the Middle East.

Syrian Crisis

Syria has been plunged into a civil war for almost a decade, a war which has become the deadliest conflict of the 21st century. What began as a demonstration

against the government of Damascus soon turned into a civil war and is now becoming a regional conflict for power and influence in the region. Syria has become a battlefield where the struggle for power in the region is unfolding – all the main actors of the region are represented here, as well as many external forces that directly or indirectly support one or the other side of the conflict. The old regional order has been destroyed, the contours of the future device are still not visible, and it is hardly necessary to talk about the complete dismantling of the old system. Revolutionary Iran, conservative Saudi Arabia, ambitious Qatar, and neo-Ottoman Turkey are regional forces seeking, through victory in the Syrian conflict, to redraw from the region per their interests and goals.

According to some analysts, the Syrian conflict has shifted the focus of attention from Israel and the Arab-Israeli confrontation to the struggle for regional hegemony between Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey: "Syria has become part of a region-wide brawl, the purpose of which is to review two interconnected balances of power: one – between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Persian Gulf; the other is for the general regional balance of power between the American-Israeli axis and Iran" **[4]**.

Syria is now experiencing one of the most severe humanitarian disasters in recent history; recovering from such destruction in Germany after World War II took almost half a century and significant economic support for the Marshall Plan.

Destabilized and destroyed Syria is a threat to global security and undermines the international fight against terrorism and the West's efforts to promote global democracy. Adherents' main questions about interventions and the doctrine of "Responsibility to Protect" is why the international community reacted very quickly to the crisis in Libya, which is rich in oil resources, but could not develop a similar approach to Syria.

The Syrian war is even more confusing than the Libyan crisis of 2011. There are no permanent "safe zones" for the civilian population, and there is a complete lack of confidence that an extensive military intervention will be beneficial. Moreover, international involvement has become the cause of an even greater

militarization of the conflict. Despite the primacy of the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine, many allies are confident that they will be blamed for any negative consequences that followed the intervention.

NATO's participation in the restoration of Syria would obligate it to protect the country in the future, and NATO is not ready for such responsibility. NATO does not currently have the military, economic and political resources to carry out such an elaborate campaign. Moreover, there is no political vision that such resources can be allocated to undertake such a mission, especially after the experience of Afghanistan and Libya. Fifteen years ago, under the neo-conservative administration of George W. Bush, conditions such as regional destabilization, genocide, and uncontrolled migration flows could have become a well-founded basis for the intervention.

All this is clearly visible in Syria but does not lead to war or intervention. Moreover, these premises are used as arguments against intervention at NATO headquarters. The E.U. is conducting a refugee relief operation in the Mediterranean. The U.N. Security Council destroys chemical weapons in Syria. The role of NATO is limited to expanding activities in Iraq. It seems that the NATO member countries themselves are not trying to show the Alliance as the preferred platform for resolving the Syrian conflict.

Turkey is one reason why NATO is trying not to get involved in the conflict in Syria. Turkey itself has been reluctant to join the coalition against ISIS only in 2015 and does not support NATO's participation in its settlement. The reason for this is conflicting interests.

NATO and key Western countries have their views on the issue of the preferred resolution of the conflict, which is not consistent with the position of Turkey. Moreover, before the incident with a Russian bomber shot down by Turkish troops and the subsequent breakdown of relations between Russia and Turkey, Ankara resisted full involvement in the activities of the coalition against ISIS with all its might.

The incident with the bomber caused much controversy in the Council of the Alliance. As a result, the situation could be viewed from the following positions: Turkey alone shot down a Russian military aircraft and the North Atlantic Council was not informed about this action and would not have supported such drastic measures. Turkey, on the other hand, made this decision at the highest level, which is why such a quick break in relations between Moscow and Ankara followed. Moreover, Turkey itself did not apply to the Alliance for the security guarantees provided for in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty after the incident.

A coalition against ISIS led by the United States was created during the 2014 Welsh NATO Summit. The fact that America tried to negotiate with each of the allies separately without resorting to a general meeting within the framework of the North Atlantic Council once again demonstrates that the United States tried to do everything to deter NATO's involvement in this operation.

In general, the U.S. administration was reluctant to take responsibility for a new long-term intervention in the Middle East. The United States has been involved in continuous wars for more than a decade in an attempt to bring "security and stability" to the Middle East.

At the moment, NATO has experience in engaging in the resolution of complex and large-scale crises in the Middle East and North Africa. The Alliance has developed an effective response system in crises due to the full involvement of partner countries, thus strengthening the position of NATO as an international organization promoting the interests of the West.

However, involvement in crisis management is associated with a long process of finding consensus among all member states, which limits the possible flexibility and effectiveness of the Alliance. Under the conditions of the "smart defense" policy, the most effective NATO operations will only involve the participation of the most significant allies. Otherwise, the difference and the limits of the potential of each will become apparent.

Finally, the experience of NATO interventions demonstrates that stability cannot be achieved exclusively by military means but requires full-scale post-crisis

regulation and state-building operations, without which all efforts will be in vain and adversely affect the security environment.

An analysis of the events in Syria showed that, first, NATO's receipt of an official U.N. Security Council mandate to conduct an operation in Syria is almost impossible. Secondly, the extreme complexity of the Syrian crisis makes it difficult to predict the course of events and the results of possible actions. Many allies are confident that the campaign will be ineffective, and they will be guilty of any adverse consequences of the intervention. Thirdly, NATO is not ready to take responsibility for the restoration of Syria. Fourth, Turkey's inconsistent positions on how to best resolve the conflict, on the one hand, and the United States, Britain, France, and Germany's on the other, led the situation to a dead end. Fifth, the Eastern European countries of the Alliance, pursuing their interests in the organization, are also against the operation in Syria.

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NATO's limited role in the Iraq crisis indicates the strength of the positions of both the United States and European allies in their influence on the Alliance's policy. So far, a unified vision of the role of NATO in regulating the issues of "hard security" in the Middle East and North Africa has not been developed. Each case, as can be seen during the Libyan crisis of 2011 and the Syrian civil war, is considered separately, depending on unique conditions and circumstances. Moreover, the agreement reached between the United States and Europeans and the desire to assign greater responsibility to the European allies led to increased activity of the Alliance in the Middle East region and the operation "Unified Protector" in Libya in 2011. Meanwhile, this harmony does not mean and does not guarantee full consensus between the allies.

In the context of the war in Syria, NATO's detachment from the "global war on terrorism" became evident. The Alliance is not able to conduct a military operation in the Mediterranean, which would effectively bring about the resolution the problems, as well as other regional crises. The role of NATO in the fight against the main challenge of our time – international terrorism – is minimized and

remains auxiliary to a great extent due to the difficulty of reaching consensus in the fundamentally diverging views and approaches of the Allies in responding to new challenges and threats.

In the prognostic plan, there is every reason to believe that in the event of aggravation of crisis trends and growing uncertainty in world politics, the accented significance of the Alliance's regional policy and its strategy as a whole will gradually erode. It will give way to less binding provisions, theses, and formulations designed to smooth out existing and inevitable future political and financial tensions among NATO member countries.

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НОВЫЕ ТЕНДЕНЦИИ В АРХИТЕКТУРЕ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ И СТАБИЛЬНОСТИ НА БЛИЖНЕМ ВОСТОКЕ

NEW TRENDS IN SECURITY AND STABILITY ARCHITECTURE OF MIDDLE EAST

Аннотация: в статье рассматриваются последние противоречивые и бурные тенденции в социально-экономической и военной сфере на Ближнем Востоке, которые исключают любую возможность положить конец многолетней нестабильности в регионе. Тем не менее, различные примеры, приведенные в статье, иллюстрируют разнообразие и многовекторность развития отдельных стран ближневосточного региона, которые сейчас находятся на пороге нового этапа своего развития.

Abstract: the article focuses on the recent contradictory and turbulent trends in the Middle East socio-economic and military sphere that have excluded any possibility to put an end to many years of instability in the region. However, various examples given in the article illustrate the diversity and multi-vector development of individual countries in the Middle East region, which are now on the threshold of a new stage of their development.

Ключевые слова: Ближний Восток, НАТОБВ, военное присутствие, архитектура безопасности.

Key words: the Middle East, NATOME, military presence, security architecture.

The Middle East is now on the eve of a new chapter in its history which may result in a new round of tension and consequently lead to a new large-scale conflict. Conversely, this new stage of development in the Middle East may be the beginning of a successful and better-developed region.

The heterogeneity of the Middle East and its disunity are also on the agenda. Geographically, the borders of the Middle East are more or less defined. Nevertheless, when experts assess the situation in the Middle East, political, social and other processes voluntarily or involuntarily force them to take into account countries that, by and large, are not related to the geographical Middle East. There are a number of experts who use the term "Greater Middle East" to describe the complex and confusing cohesion of the region **[1]**.

In addition, the public is sometimes subjected to fake news about the state of the Middle East which contains obvious contradictory, multidirectional trends and ultimately paints an inaccurate picture of the situation. It is quite clear that even in the Middle East there are tremendous transformations taking place and that many countries of the region are moving in completely opposite directions. Egypt shows us one direction of development, Turkey – another, and the UAE – a third. Moreover, there are numerous of types of development. With all this diversity, however, it is nevertheless necessary to answer the question of whether it is possible to put an end to many years of instability in the region.

Undoubtedly, there are reasons for optimism. First of all, the modern world, of which the Middle East is a part, is extremely interdependent and – with all the insufficiency of global regulation – seeks to minimize and limit conflicts. Not a single modern global player – neither Russia, nor the USA, nor Western Europe – is interested in a disaster. Of course, one can always say that the efforts are

insufficient and that everyone has their own interests, but there is no reason to suspect the mentioned players of any terrifying conspiracy **[2]**.

Moreover, the countries of the region themselves, sometimes demonstrating very cruel methods of conducting politics, still try not to cross the line. A rather striking example is the latest aggravation of relations between Iran and the United States. In general, after the military defeat of the main forces of the ISIS (an organization banned in Russia), there has not been a noticeable escalation of military operations per se. Unfortunately, talking about a complete ceasefire is also not possible.

Among the reasons for optimism are the economic growth of a number of countries in the region and the immersion of the countries of the region in the modern global communication environment. Although this environment has certain contradictory elements, it still offers a wide informational context and enlightens the residents of the region to a certain extent, primarily new generations.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing disintegration of traditional society in the Middle East, young generations are becoming louder and insisting on creating conditions more similar to developed countries' standard of living. Socio-economic problems, poor elite turnover, lack of clear prospects, and an uncertain future push people to the streets and to protests which are sometimes quite aggressive. Many countries of the region such as Lebanon, Iran, and Algeria are examples of this **[3]**.

On the one hand, this is a threat to order, since it indicates a decline in the mechanisms of socialization of youth. On the other hand, it inspires hope that fresh social forces will force the ruling elites to take the steps necessary for sustainable development and find a compromise that will please the active part of the population.

However, the situation also warrants pessimism. As such, the youth protests contain a strong and destructive impulse since in many cases they lead to the same young people's involvement in radical and extremist organizations and terrorist activities. Alas, the transformation of traditional societies in the Middle East and

the destruction of the traditional family and religious system make tens, if not hundreds of thousands of young people, ready-made cannon fodder for radical preachers.

The increase in the number and variety of conflicts does not encourage optimism. As noted above, in general, almost all forces show a certain restraint, but this restraint may not be enough. The line separating today's “moderately limited” (a rather terrible expression) violent conflict from a radical and irreversible escalation, (i.e. a big war) is thin. In any case, the reaction of markets and public opinion to any aggravation shows that the danger is close.

Another risk is that the region has been torn apart by conflicts of various origins: religious, social, ethnic, state, economic, and even cultural and historical. Their interweaving is truly amazing and often creates insurmountable difficulties for their resolution. The situation in Iraq is a vivid illustration of this **[4]**.

In general, it is quite difficult to answer the question about the future of the Middle East unequivocally: considering the current state of the Middle East, bearing in mind that the circumstances I have listed are far from exhaustive, there are still many factors that must be taken into account. NATO has been plowing rather turbulent waters for several years, and the meeting of the Alliance’s defense ministers in Brussels on February 12–13, 2020 did not show any signs of calm. Particular attention on the agenda was given to the role of NATO in the Middle East, its presence in Afghanistan, relations between NATO and the EU, and reaction to Russia's missile defense plans. The defense ministers first met after a stormy summit in December at which the US president refused to attend the final ceremonies and after which Washington demanded a more prominent role in the alliance in the Middle East.

The U.S. decision to eliminate Iranian General Qasem Soleimani on January 3 was again followed by the Trump administration’s stiff demands for NATO members to play a more prominent role in this troubled region, especially in Iraq. The reaction of the Iraqi leadership to the assassination of Soleimani and calls for the withdrawal of US troops from the country have led Americans to urge their

NATO allies to fill the vacuum. President Trump even came up with the new acronym NATOME: NATO in the Middle East **[5]**.

The American president remained true to the line that he had been following for the past three years and reiterated that NATO allies needed to deploy more troops directly to the region, spend more on defense and be more involved in operations in the Middle East as they have more direct interests there than the United States. For the three decades since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the alliance has struggled to gain its identity, but a poorly formulated role in the Middle East, which is not of strategic interest to all 29 member states, is unlikely to breathe new life into NATO's activities.

The European Member States are not interested in any plan that would include an increase in the number of troops in the Middle East and direct participation in ground operations in numerous hot spots. Not long ago, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said that Ankara could ban the US military from using the İncirlik and Kürecik bases in response to US sanctions. On December 23, the US State Department opposed the imposition of sanctions against Turkey. As was stated in a note to the Senate, American diplomats fear that such a move would lead to the rapprochement of Ankara and Moscow and harm US national interests. On December 24, a message appeared that the Pentagon had concluded a contract with several Turkish companies for construction work at the İncirlik airbase in Adana province. According to expert Aaron Stein, Ankara will surely try to minimize the damage **[6]**.

The story is not always predictable, however. Ankara could bring down the NATO missile defense system and break off partnerships with the United States. Since President Trump took over, NATO allies have avoided directly rejecting his insistent proposals that they consider unacceptable **[7]**. Instead, they have sought to calm the explosive president. This time, the defense ministers did not say “no” either and agreed to expand the NATO training mission in Iraq, reassigning some contingents already in the country as part of the international coalition to train the Iraqi army to counter threats from ISIS (an organization banned in Russia), and the

like. The instructors will change their leadership, and in the meantime, NATO will explore the possibilities of expanding the tasks of the mission.

The shuffling of troops around Iraq and the rebranding of the mission were the only concrete result of the latest meeting of NATO defense ministers. This allows the Allies to claim that they responded to Washington's demand to play a more prominent role in the Middle East and spread the experience gained by the alliance in Afghanistan there. However, they will not have to take any measures that could lead to domestic political consequences. Whether they have to do anything specific depends on whether the Iraqi government is ready to abandon the requirement to withdraw foreign troops from the country. However, it is uncertain as to whether President Trump will be satisfied with such a decision by NATO regarding the Middle East.

The weak attention of European and American media to the ministerial meeting and the decision concerning Iraq contrasts with the very high-profile statements Trump made in January. This may indicate that NATO members are trying to give the alliance a break while maintaining a dialogue with the skeptical administration of the United States **[8]**. Members of the alliance continue to disagree on what to do with the alleged Russian threat and whether the alliance should become an instrument to combat the growing role and power of China. It is appropriate to pose the question: does such a threat actually exist? EU member states are torn between the desire to remain in the transatlantic alliance and the need to begin developing their own security architecture **[9]**. At the same time, they do not have a common opinion on threats and strategic goals.

Everyone is waiting for the results of the presidential election in November 2020 in the hope that NATO will again worry only about what role the alliance should play in the world order and not about what threat the organization's most important partner will put forward this time. Most likely, the defense ministers left Brussels with a sense of relief and joy that they managed to get rid of another explosive problem. However, their relief is likely to be short-lived. How the

situation will develop in the future is completely impossible to predict in the current tense political situation.

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РОССИЯ И НАТО: НОВАЯ ПАРАДИГМА ОТНОШЕНИЙ

RUSSIA AND NATO: NEW PARADIGM OF RELATIONS

Аннотация: автором представлен анализ нынешних отношений России и НАТО, определены причины такого противостояния и указаны меры, которые могут уменьшить ущерб от устоявшейся парадигмы отношений России и НАТО.

Abstract: the author provides an analysis of the current Russia and NATO relationship identifies the reasons for such confrontation and specifies the measures that could reduce the damage from the established paradigm of Russia and NATO relations.

Ключевые слова: НАТО, противостояние Россия-НАТО, движущие силы отношений Россия-НАТО, сценарии.

Key words: NATO, the Russia-NATO confrontation, drivers of Russia-NATO relations, scenarios.

After the Ukrainian crisis, relations between Russia and NATO after the Ukrainian crisis reached their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. Their deterioration was sharp, avalanche-like and irreversible. Today, Russia is the

number one security challenge for NATO. At the very least, the final communiqué of the NATO's Warsaw Summit gives Russia key importance. Moreover, the Russian policy of the Alliance worked out in the form of plans and specific measures better than any other area, including the Middle East and the fight against terrorism. Russian official documents also define NATO and the likelihood of an enlargement of the bloc as one of its key challenges. In addition, the modernization of the Russian armed forces primarily takes into account the potentials of the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.

To date, the state of Russia-NATO relations can be assessed as "stably difficult". There was a difficult phase in which it was very challenging to predict the further development of the situation and the depth of the crisis. However, the crisis did not solve any of the problems that made it possible. Moreover, these problems have been further aggravated, which means that the likelihood of a new aggravation and further escalation of the conflict remains high.

Such a situation would hardly have seemed unusual 30 years ago in an ideological and military race of two blocs. The world has fundamentally changed, however. Both NATO countries and Russia face a growing number of fundamentally new challenges and threats. The problem is that instead of focusing on the challenges of today and tomorrow, Russia and the Alliance are replicating the logic that is customary for the Cold War. Both are losers in this situation. Moreover, the magnitude of the loss is not obvious: it can be fixed at current levels, or it can become much more serious in the event of new crises.

In light of this problem, it is important to answer the following questions: why are Russia and NATO once again becoming competitors? What are the driving forces of relations between Russia and NATO; what factors influence them? And what should be done in order to enter a more constructive relationship?

Before answering these questions, it is necessary to determine our normative position - an idea of the proper state of security in Europe. This view boils down to the fact that neither Russia nor the NATO countries are interested in an armed conflict, the consequences of which can be dire. The implementation of this

installation in the current conditions by both parties is carried out by mutual containment. In the long run, however, this approach is losing. First, containment is fraught with the escalation of competition into a full-fledged conflict [3]. Secondly, it requires enormous resources, which can and should be directed to more serious challenges. Among them is the fight against radical Islamism. Therefore, the task is to find a formula that would save both sides from at least the need for deterrence. At the maximum, it would make it possible to return to the issue of cooperation. This is an extremely difficult political task, which under the current conditions may seem utopian, but the rejection of its solution is fraught with high costs and high security risks.

NATO-Russia: the path to crisis

The normative position mentioned above likely does not seem to be anything new. Skeptics will undoubtedly point out that in recent history, an attempt to replace deterrence with cooperation has already been made. This attempt ended in complete failure, symbolized by the Ukrainian crisis, which is considered to be the main catalyst for the complication of the situation in Europe. Indeed, it became a powerful trigger that transformed relations between Russia and NATO to existence on a qualitatively different plane. However, it should be considered more of a consequence, not a cause. The contradictions between Russia and NATO have accumulated since at least the late 1990s, gradually deteriorating every year. The smooth accumulation of contradictions ended in the Ukrainian explosion and a sudden change in the situation. Therefore, it is important to understand the defects in our relationship that have led to the current state of things.

The most obvious reason for the gradual complication of the dialogue between Russia and NATO is quite naturally associated with the expansion of NATO to the East. Indeed, in Russia the attitude toward this process from the very beginning was very restrained. It was perceived as undermining the idea of equal and indivisible security, a violation of the balance of power, and a threat to Russia's security. On the NATO side, Moscow’s concern has traditionally been countered by a reference to the rights of individual countries to determine their

own membership in alliances. Moreover, this norm was fixed in the Russia-NATO Founding Act in 1997. The discussion of this topic between Moscow and Brussels more and more resembled a conversation between the dumb and the deaf. Russia was quite tolerant of the entry into NATO of all former members of the ATS, as well as the Baltic countries. However, her irritation increased markedly when it came to further advancement into the post-Soviet space. Although the membership of Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries in NATO raised great questions and was considered by the Alliance itself to be a very distant prospect, Moscow made serious diplomatic efforts to stop or significantly slow down this process.

These actions of Russia are hardly worth explaining by their fanatical desire to harm the West. The policy of Moscow has quite rational grounds which are often overlooked. These foundations lie within the Russia-NATO Founding Act of 1997.

The fact is that, along with the recognition of the right of each state to independently determine its security policy and membership in alliances, the parties have identified at least two more fundamental foundations of their relations. First, they viewed the OSCE as a key organization responsible for creating a new security system in Europe. Secondly, the Treaty on the Limitation of Conventional Arms in Europe (CFE) was considered to be an important guarantor of maintaining a balance of power. Its implementation was precisely the prerequisite for removing the issue of deterrence. The successful adaptation of the CFE Treaty to new conditions (the collapse of the USSR and the ATS), as well as the strengthening of the role of the OSCE, would remove the issue of self-determination of individual countries in favor of one or another alliance. Given an effective arms control system and a common security organization, NATO expansion would be much less painful for Russia or not at all perceived as a threat.

In fact, the situation was different. The adapted CFE Treaty, adopted at the OSCE Istanbul Summit in 1999, was never ratified by NATO countries although Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and some other countries have ratified it. The Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) generally refused to join the CFE Treaty. If

they joined NATO, which happened in 2004, a “gray zone” would appear at the borders of Russia, which would not be controlled by the treaty. The role of the OSCE in the discussion of security issues was gradually declining while NATO essentially assumed the functions of the main organization for security in Europe. In these conditions, the expansion of NATO was logically perceived by Moscow as a problem, and this feeling intensified with the consistent erosion of the CFE dialogue **[15]**.

An important factor in the complication of relations between Russia and NATO was also the overall deterioration of the situation in the field of strategic stability. This issue has traditionally been the subject of relations between Moscow and Washington and basically boiled down to nuclear missile issues. The US withdrawal from the ABM treaty, the subsequent discussion on missile defense in Europe, the creation of individual elements of missile defense there, again, were restrained in Moscow. Russian proposals for a joint missile defense were not successful although the military and diplomats worked on the issue on both sides. The achievement was the new strategic offensive arms treaty of 2010. However, the further deployment of missile defense in Europe was contrary to Russia's concerns on this issue, which was recorded in the preamble to the strategic offensive arms treaty. In addition, while before the Ukrainian crisis, Western diplomacy insisted that the missile defense was not directed against Russia, against the backdrop of Ukrainian events, voices about using missile defense as a deterrent to Russia got louder. This only reinforced Moscow’s long-standing suspicions. Problems in the dialogue on strategic stability between Russia and the United States, of course, negatively affected the Russia-NATO dialogue.

In the western capitals, dissatisfaction also grew with Russia's increasingly active security policy. The new NATO members in Eastern Europe were concerned about the possible growth of Russia's military potential. The situation was aggravated by anti-Russian sentiments in these countries, the painful experience of the communist past, its transformation into a kind of “black legend”, and of Russia into a “significant other”. These fears were largely exaggerated, and

in fact, the countries of Eastern Europe were reluctant to increase military budgets. In all fairness, it should be noted that in Russia itself, the perception of the military threat from NATO was also exaggerated. This is especially true of public discourse and the media. There was a situation when NATO's opposition turned into a profitable product that guaranteed political capital and support for large segments of society. Like the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe, Russia also experienced a political transit, with all the ensuing consequences for public consciousness. It was also characterized by the painful experience of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The public mood, in this case, played a negative role.

Finally, another important factor was the instability of political regimes in a number of post-Soviet countries and a series of "color revolutions" in these states. The first "color revolutions" in Georgia and Ukraine (in 2003 and 2004) were perceived by Moscow without unnecessary hostility. However, the subsequent anti-Russian course of both states substantially cooled this attitude. "Color revolutions" in Moscow began to be perceived as the anti-Russian policy of the West, an element of a new hybrid war. By the time of Maidan 2013, the "color revolutions" in Moscow were strongly associated with the "hand of the West" and the desire to oust Russia from the post-Soviet space with all the ensuing consequences for the country's security.

This view of Moscow also seems ambiguous. Still, the Ukrainian Maidan in 2013 was largely due to internal causes and the weakness of the Ukrainian state itself. Nevertheless, neither Russia, nor the USA, nor the EU were able to solve the Ukrainian crisis together, although there were prerequisites for such a solution. The subsequent extremely sharp reaction of Russia in the form of reunification with Crimea and the support of separatists in the east of Ukraine took place on the fertile ground of the trust and institutional base of European security undermined over the past twenty years. The Ukrainian crisis is a series of erroneous decisions, incorrect assessments, and exaggerated fears on both sides. In the conditions of effective institutions, it would probably become an absurd accident-fluctuation.

Without such institutions, this fluctuation has led to fundamental changes on the European continent **[7]**.

Drivers of Russia-NATO Relations

Today we have to admit that deterrence is a key element of relations between Russia and NATO. In fact, we are talking about a "new normality", out of which it will be extremely difficult. However, this is not the most dangerous trend. It is much worse that this "new normality" may well usher in a new crisis and a further regression of relations. In order to avoid this scenario, it is necessary to soberly assess the factors (governing parameters) of the interaction between Russia and NATO. Among these parameters, it is necessary to single out large factors of the strategic plan and small factors of a tactical nature. The latter are important, since it is precisely them, like the Ukrainian crisis, that they can provoke a violation of the “new normality”, acting as a trigger for a new crisis.

The first strategic factor is the state of threats beyond the Russia-NATO relationship. There is reason to believe that the instability overwhelming the Middle East region has the potential to spread to other regions and will have a long-term impact on both Russia and NATO countries, including the United States. Especially vulnerable are the Mediterranean countries - Turkey, Greece, Italy, France. Russia is vulnerable due to possible destabilization in the Caucasus, as well as risks in Central Asia. The role of NATO in solving the Syrian and other problems remains secondary. The main player here is still the United States. If Russia and the United States manage to make progress in resolving the Syrian problem and interact in the matter of building a new security system in the Middle East, this could have a positive effect on the general background of relations between Russia and NATO. In the meantime, Russia's actions in Syria and on the front of the fight against radical Islamism in NATO countries are perceived more with suspicion than with support.

The second strategic factor is the state of the Alliance itself and its ability to repel those threats that are important for Europeans here and now. There is no doubt that NATO can successfully restrain Russia. However, the Alliance is

simply not suited to responding to challenges such as refugee flows, Islamic terrorism, or the collapse of states on the European periphery. It turns out that the European taxpayer pays to contain Russia, but threats come to the country from a completely different perspective. This also applies to the taxpayer in Russia itself, which also pays for NATO containment from the Russian side. Sooner or later, this contradiction will make itself felt. The future of NATO depends on its ability to transform into a more flexible bloc and adapt to new threats. An interesting event in this regard was the emergence of a new EU Global Strategy. It takes a very obvious course towards strengthening the EU's role in security matters, despite References to the fact that NATO remains an important partner in this situation. The EU's success in building its own security structures will have an important impact on NATO's future. For the Alliance, the internal stability of its members will play an important role. A recent attempt at a military coup in Turkey, which almost turned into a civil war, is important for NATO, which positions itself as a community of democratic states.

The third strategic factor is the state of the Russian economy and its political course. The power and stability of the Russian state after the collapse of the USSR have long been underestimated in the West. Today, though, Russian potential should not be overestimated. Russia faces the unresolved tasks of economic modernization, the development of technology and human potential. In modern conditions, all this is directly related to the political weight of the country. Thirty years ago, economic difficulties in the USSR became an important factor in the revision of relations with the West. There is no doubt that even today this factor will be important given the mistakes made in the late 1980s.

Among the tactical factors, the following should be noted:

The first is the peace process in the Donbass, the stability of the Ukrainian state and the post-Soviet space as a whole. The situation in Ukraine remains shaky. The collapse of the Minsk process, the resumption of hostilities in the Donbass, and the spread of instability outside the Donbass will inevitably worsen relations between Russia and NATO. It is unlikely that NATO will go to military

intervention in the conflict. However, any aggravation will have painful consequences for European security.

The second is incidents at sea and in the air, especially in the Baltic and Black Sea regions. Dangerous maneuvering of ships, ships and aircrafts of Russia and NATO countries is fraught with the risk of unintentional collisions. In turn, this can lead to unwanted escalation and local conflict. The excessive reaction to such incidents of the Baltic countries of NATO and neutral states only aggravate the significance of this factor **[14]**.

Third, there are many "black swans" on the periphery of Europe. Incidents in Syria with the shelling of a UN humanitarian column, as well as attacks by forces of the US-led coalition against the Syrian government army are examples of such incidents. They nearly thwarted the agreements between the United States and Russia on the settlement of the Syrian conflict, reached with such an amount of efforts.

What to do?

Understanding the driving forces of relations between Russia and NATO, as well as the risks of deepening existing contradictions, dictates a number of necessary measures. Such measures should at least reduce the damage from the established paradigm of our relations, and as a best case scenario, bring them into a more constructive direction.

Among these measures, the following can be identified:

The first is the preservation and development of the Russia-NATO Council. The Council should remain an important communication tool between the Russian leadership and the Alliance countries. Such communication should be constant. It can help prevent the undesirable consequences of incidents at sea and in the air, as well as other unintended and poorly controlled factors. In addition, this mechanism must be used for strategic dialogue regarding new challenges and threats.

The second is a return to the discussion of the question of conventional arms control in Europe (COVE), given that the closure of the CFE Treaty has become an important reason for this situation. At the same time, it must be understood that

restarting the dialogue on COVE can no longer mechanically copy the CFE Treaty due to changing technological and political conditions.

The third involves maintaining the treaty on intermediate and shorter-range missiles (INF) as a fundamental condition for nuclear missile security. This issue has traditionally been in line with Russian-American relations, but it directly affects the security of European NATO members, who will be most affected by its erosion **[11]**.

The fourth is a pause in NATO expansion. The issue in this case is not only about Ukraine and Georgia - the Alliance itself is skeptical of their membership. It also concerns changing the neutral status of Sweden and Finland. Both countries already have deep partnerships with NATO, but their formal membership is likely to adversely affect relations with Russia and lead to their loss of the status of an “honest broker” in relations between Russia and NATO. Russia, in turn, should help alleviate the concerns of these countries regarding incidents at sea and in the air in the Baltic region.

Fifth, there should be mutual abstinence from building up military contingents in the places of geographic contact of NATO and Russia.

Sixth, cooperation in Afghanistan should resume, taking into account the positive experience gained from such interaction in the past.

The final measure is the implementation of the Minsk agreements. Although NATO as an institution is not a party to the Donbass peace process, the Ukrainian crisis directly affects relations between Russia and the Alliance. The concerted efforts of Ukraine, Russia, France and Germany as members of the "Norman Four", as well as the United States as the most significant player in NATO in ensuring peace in the east of Ukraine are needed.

Behind all these measures should also be a long-term vision of the future of European security. It is necessary to return to the discussion of the general strategic framework of our relations, in particular, to adapt the Helsinki principles to new challenges. This should also include strengthening the OSCE as an institution of pan-European security.

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ЖЕСТОКИЙ ПРОВАЛ ЭПОХИ ПОСЛЕ ОКОНЧАНИЯ "ХОЛОДНОЙ ВОЙНЫ": РОССИЯ-НАТО

BRUTAL FAILURE OF POST-COLD WAR ERA: RUSSIA-NATO RELATIONS

Аннотация: в статье дается анализ развития отношений России и Североатлантического договора. Автор поднимает вопрос о роли НАТО в обеспечении системы международного сотрудничества и безопасности в контексте современных угроз.

Abstract: the article provides an analysis of the development of Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty relationship. The author raises the issue of the role of NATO in ensuring an international cooperation system and security in the context of current threats.

Ключевые слова: НАТО, противостояние Россия-НАТО, эпоха после окончания холодной войны, международный порядок, сценарии.

Key words: NATO, the NATO-Russia confrontation, the post-Cold War era, international order, scenarios.

In a world of rapid modernization and globalization, international security has become a problem that needs to be addressed comprehensively and solved definitively. Threats created due to the ongoing revolution of technology and the internet, the rise of non-state actors, emergence of intra-state conflicts, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW), illegal immigration, and organized crime pose similar and serious security challenges to states. Such complex threats are likely to have negative and destabilizing consequences. To prevent and combat potential threats, it is necessary for the international community to establish a more cohesive and effective cooperation system while promoting strong dialogue with one other. Unfortunately, the so-called new but artificial world order swiftly exploited the dissolution of the Soviet Union (USSR) and its absence of an opposing military and economic organization, thus managing to seize the system by a global coup d'état **[10**, p. 23-25**]**. This order, which was created through manipulative agendas and bureaucratic discrimination, remains the biggest but most neglected obstacle in the way of achieving a unanimous response mechanism to ensure global safety. The contemporary attempt to impose Western values and norms globally while threatening the national sovereignty and cultural uniqueness of certain countries **[2**, p. 58**]**, prevents states from adopting a broader vision and paves the way for a global realignment. The persistent continuation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), established in 1949 and whose main raison d'être was containment of the Soviet Union, is a living and concrete example of the failure of alliance politics to encourage a common international security perspective.

The international system, despite the end of Cold War, has failed to establish an inclusive order that would essentially eliminate the mentality of superiority and put forward the concept of equality needed for cooperative international security. On the contrary, the US-dominated West continues to seek the shelter of NATO from a non-existent enemy while celebrating a questionable victory and enforcing

a Western approach to liberal international order. Additionally, as Richard Sakwa cleverly points out, the years between 1989 and 2014 were actually an era of "cold peace," where Russia was dramatically deprived of negotiations on post-Cold War security order in Europe **[14**, p. 21**]** and where Russian willingness to "join the club of recognized democratic states"**[7**, p. 3**]** was highly ignored. The true nature of this Western Alliance was exposed in 1999 with the "democratic" bombing of Yugoslavia, which took place without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Under the slogan of promoting democracy, the West capitalized on this event by implementing its long-established aim of overthrowing any inconvenient legal authority in any country **[15]**. Therefore, NATO, claiming to be a political and military alliance acting with the aim of collective defence **[11]**, is nowadays nothing but an "expensive fiction"**[3**, p. 62**]** which amplifies differences, strengthens historical grievances, and incites aggression – thanks to its continued territorial as well as ideological expansion and unnecessary 'democratic' interferences.

The later actions of NATO, but especially the redundant insistence on the enlargement of this Western order, was the ultimate embodiment of the sharp contrast between what can now be described as Europe and Eurasia. George F. Kennan was right in saying that "expanding NATO would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era" **[5]**. It was and is still a major blow to the new world order envisioned by Gorbachev, which was based on the consensus of all mankind and a "common European home" **[4]**. For Russia, transformation at the time was the key issue. The Western preservation of existing institutions and structures of the Cold War era raised valid suspicions among Russians. Since the emergence of Moscow as the capital, the major threats to Russian security always came from Europe, thus making the indivisibility of European security a vital Russian interest. Russia was probably much more interested in a security architecture which would be created with and by Russia **[16]** and also would ensure non-aggression towards both her territory and the post-Soviet space. However, the development of NATO-Russia relations in the post-

Cold War era evolved into something that included Russia in theory, but in reality was much more about her exclusion. This created a competitive and eventually confrontational environment. The fundamental outcome was the creation of a less predictable and unsecure world, in which achieving common grounds for international security as a matter of course became more obscure.

The root problem behind the ideology of NATO, which – to give credit – has evolved from being an anti-Soviet organization to merely an anti-Russian one, is that due to its institutional structure, it gives the United States a hegemonic role, where every its action is either directed or not objected to by the United States **[16]**. Russia, who values her sovereignty and wants to practice it in a multipolar world, considers NATO being used by the United States as a tool for keeping Central and Eastern Europe under control or accepting the hegemony of another actor to be unacceptable. In a US-dominated NATO and a NATO dominated Europe, the Russian priority is then to preserve the neutral and Russia-centric countries' positions. Unless we can go back in time to prevent the establishment of the USSR in 1922 or to the chain of events which resulted in the policy of containment of the Soviet Union, NATO is doomed to be seen as "a Trojan horse for US military encroachment to Russia's borders, as it presently stands" **[9]**. It has no legitimate reason to justify its current existence as the post-Cold War era had "no security vacuum that needed to be filled" **[13**, p. 44**]**. In Sakwa's words, NATO exists because it needs to manage the risks created by its existence and further enlargement **[13**, p. 45**]**. Considering these aforementioned historical points, concerns, and the current structure of the world order, the NATO-Russia confrontation, although stability is in the interest of both, is likely to stay permanent, or at least remain as it is for a very long time.

Overcoming all of the differences once and for all is probably a utopic desire given the limited areas of agreement between the two sides. However, working together in dialogue to avoid misunderstandings and consider making certain compromises are necessary factors in establishing reliable and predictable pan-European security cooperation at the international level. As the French President

Emmanuel Macron admitted recently, "we are living the end of Western hegemony…pushing Russia from Europe is a profound strategic error since it is impossible to build new security architecture in Europe without Russia. We need a rethinking of relations with Moscow. Otherwise, Europe will be stuck with being a theater for strategic struggle between the US and Russia. **[1]**" Considering the increasing political inconsistency and isolationism in the United States combined with diverging European interests, Macron's statement is indeed accurate. Although current polarization and confrontation would be greatly reduced by the dissolution of NATO, even the idea of it seems unlikely and absurd to many. If NATO is here to stay, Europe should immediately start looking for ways to separate itself from NATO and especially seek to detach the European Union's expansion from NATO's expansion.

As long as the existence of NATO is pursued, "feasible and implementable steps to reduce risks are in short supply. **[8**, p. 1**]**" The West has produced the so-called Russian threat through its actions, defining Russia "as the key security challenge, and a destabilizing factor in the European and global order." Conversely, Moscow views the expansion of NATO as an institution that excludes Russia, and Western attempts of domination and double-standards applied in various scenarios are obvious **[6**, p. 27-28**]**. Advanced confrontation would be a loss not only for Russia and the West, but for the world, as the possibility of a war between the two would be destructive for all. In order to prevent further estrangement, the West, specifically Europe, should join forces with Russia at least in elements through which basic stabilization can be accomplished. Regardless, breaking old habits is necessary for the establishment of more cooperative international security in the long-term.

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БУДУЩЕЕ СИСТЕМЫ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ. С НАТО ИЛИ БЕЗ?

FUTURE OF SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. WITH OR WITHOUT NATO?

Аннотация: данная статья посвящена роли НАТО в обеспечении будущего международной безопасности, что на сегодняшний день является проблемой для Соединенных Штатов Америки, Российской Федерации и Китайской Народной Республики.

Abstract. The present article is devoted to the role of NATO in ensuring the future of international security, which today is an issue for the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China.

Ключевые слова: НАТО, международная безопасность, Россия, США.

Key words: NATO, international security, Russia, the USA.

Unlike the nineteenth and part of the twentieth century, when the European continent and its historical processes shaped the world, the end of the Second World War and especially the final decade of the twentieth century caused the world's "center of gravity" to shift to North America (to one of the former colonies of the British Empire). Just a few decades later, we are witnessing the rise of Asia in global affairs. As an independent subject, the European Union has little or no importance in that equation on the global level. Pan-European dialogue concerning security after the installment of the American global missile defense system in Romania and Poland could produce results, but the core concerns remain **[2]**. International security today is, first of all, an issue for the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China, with many regional factors that influence possible agreements. Therefore, it is important to observe and analyze the situation in the main and possible regions of conflict: the North Atlantic (including the Baltic Sea and the Barents Sea), then the situation in the Balkans, and of course the Middle East, including the region of Central Asia.

In what manner could NATO be explained that is closest to the truth? Could NATO be an instrument of external control over the European continent? Or could NATO be seen as the result of European countries' individual needs for the system of collective security? Is NATO a product of a certain historical process that throughout history has had different forms? The creators of NATO had far fewer victims and put far less effort into defeating Nazi Germany than the USSR, but today they project their influence on territories once under USSR control (and the Russian Empire before that). There is also that fact that the Federal Republic of Germany has used the structure of former Nazi state for the formation of its intelligence service with the support of the CIA director A. Dulles ("rollback" strategy formulated by John F. Dulles) **[1]**. It is an error to think that the rise of A. Hitler in Germany is an historical anomaly; on the contrary, it represents the continuity of historical processes. Numerous Western European societies also committed atrocities, just not in "civilized Europe." USA maritime presence could be regarded as continuation of British maritime power from the colonial era.

NATO insists on free navigation and access to every point of the world, a pretext that is used to justify military presence.

NATO even insists on free navigation in areas that don't exist, for example "Sea of Asimov" **[10]**. The North Atlantic is regarded as NATO's exclusive zone of interest because of lines of communication, which could be understood to some extent. Aggressive behavior is evidenced by the fact that the Baltic Sea and Barents Sea receive the same treatment **[9]**, which shows aspirations towards controlling the Arctic region. The collapse of the USSR, with all of its consequences, left the North Atlantic as a safe zone – far behind the "front line." Today, the increase in possibilities of the Russian fleet makes the North Atlantic a possible theatre of war, as written in "NATO and North Atlantic: Revitalizing Collective Defense.", by the Royal United Institute **[5]**. In accordance with this document, the US Second Fleet, dissolved in 2011, has been reestablished. Therefore, it comes as no surprise when Air Force General Jeff Harrigan states that NATO is ready to take down air defense systems located in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad. Realization of NATO plans require a significant increase in budget expenses **[7]**. USA "threat" towards Germany **[13]** are not going to materialize (loss of control over Germany would signify leaving Europe). There is a wrong perception that rearmament, modernization, and new NATO formations are only in order to provide more profit for the American military-industrial complex – when state of war is the primary intention – not any kind of peace. The readiness of the R.F. to defend and support its national interests (as an only possibility) made it a main adversary of NATO, Wales (2014) brought the presence of NATO forces to the borders of Russian Federation. In a major step away from the Lisbon NATO summit (2010) – the R.F. was considered as a potential strategic partner. It was more a European than an American stance that ended in Ukraine (2014). Can the R. F. help Europe be more independent from the USA? In the case of any success, will the benefits satisfy the expectations of the R. F? The cultural concept of Western Europe does not seek partnership; Europe is ready to submit (an old Latin saying goes – Ex oriente lux) or to serve. Russia is not seen as part of European

civilization. Some NATO members have a high level of hostility towards the R. F. In the case of NATO's disintegration won't resort to peaceful cooperation with the R. F. In Warsaw (2016), hostility with the R.F. was set as a long-term strategy which NATO plans to enact with the strengthening of armed forces and political, diplomatic, financial and informational pressure. In Brussels (2018), a few dissonant voices have called attention to the strengthening of the naval component and development of new tactics. The intention of NATO to restrict access of the R.F. to the North Atlantic is not its final aim; it intends to secure the background in order to "move the front line" towards the Arctic region. The forming of the NATO command center for the Atlantic, Norfolk (Virginia, USA), the Center for Logistics and rear support for the rapid deployment of troops in Ulm (Germany), and the Center for Cyber operations (Belgium) shows the tendency to put NATO forces under one command and to remove obstacles (political or national) to their mobility on European soil. Rhetoric of cooperation, peace and partnership, as obviously insincere, is more and more becoming a provocation from NATO's side.

Hysteria is building up in Scandinavia: there are spying dolphins, fully equipped Russian Special Forces riding bikes like locals, submarines parked near malls in Oslo, military satellites disrupting the phone connection between an old Norwegian granny and her LGBT grandson, and lack of "pride" parades in the R.F. as a constant source of stress for the sensitive LGBT community. Bursts of anti-Russian hysteria in Scandinavia reminds the population that the aggression is "real". The intention is to create sense of insecurity among the population and to lead neutral countries into joining NATO. The intention of formally neutral Sweden and its new strategic defense (new submarines, planes, air defense system – patriot and conscription plan) **[3]** is acceptable; it is the intention to cooperate with NATO that is concerning. The readiness of Sweden to risk 300 years of peace is hard to logically understand. Swedish actions would make Finland (as the final aim) vulnerable to similar wishes. Eventually expanding the "frontline" from the Baltic-Black Sea to the Arctic (Barents Sea) – Black Sea by joining Sweden and Finland to NATO, or close cooperation that would result in the loss of neutral

status would place significant pressure on the R.F. Specifically, there would be more expenses for the defense sector and bigger demographic pressure – the need for new armed formations as an answer to endangerment of St. Petersburg and, in the first place, Murmansk, Kola peninsula. This would also help to strengthen NATO members' ties – a stronger and longer presence of the USA in Europe [9].

Present tensions aren't enough to provoke such development of events (neutral countries joining NATO). Can aggressive NATO activities propel one NATO state (in the north of Europe, or other places) into (accidentally planned!) actions, as in Georgia 2008? This is hard to answer because of the uncertainty as to the potential scale of the conflict. The potential that the Russian army demonstrated in Syria could make that scenario unlikely. However, that option must be taken into consideration.

Members of NATO in the Mediterranean, exposed to the pressure from Africa and Middle East are aware that without the R.F., they can't successfully solve those issues. As such, cooperation with the R.F. is desirable but limited to those regions – which once again shows the level of sincerity.

When analyzing the Balkans, the year 1999 is of tremendous importance as it represents a "milestone" in international relations. In all of NATO's existence, two moments distinguish themselves: a short war between NATO members Turkey and Greece, and NATO aggression on Yugoslavia on the 50th anniversary of the Alliance (NATO by force installed a military base in the strategic region of the Balkan peninsula, with full control of the east-west and north-south communication). NATO actions in Republic of Yugoslavia depict techniques used to influence a country toward the process of denationalization, (i.e. armed interference - conflicts in multicultural environments under foreign influence, political influence, economic pressure, dissolution).

The permanent Russian presence on the Balkans is casus belli for regional war.

The end of the Balkan wars 1912-13 signified territorial expansion for Serbia and Montenegro and provided resources to develop further what was

considered as the presence of Russia on the Adriatic Sea. Efforts to deny Serbian exit to the shore is evidenced by the Austro-Hungarian role in the formation of the Albanian state in 1912 **[12]**. And with the start of the process of Serbian national disintegration in Montenegro (1918), it has intensified under communist rule and is still perhaps the most radical operation of its kind, German slavist Gerhard Friedrich Franz Gesemann (1888-1948) in his book "Čojstvo i junaštvo starih crnogoraca" (1943) writes: "Montenegrin is according to his legendary belief not only the best solder in the world, but also the best Serb, more Serbian than anyone else". During the First World War, "Berlin went on insisting that Serbia must be massacred. [4]" When the war ended in Serbian favor - the gains were annulled with the formation of a dysfunctional state. This repeated the realities under communist rule: the relative independence of communist Yugoslavia and a good standard of living was supported in order to provide false image to Soviet citizens; with the fall of the Berlin wall, Yugoslavia fell as well.

A year after NATO aggression, at a conference in Bratislava organized by the US State Department and Republican Institute for Foreign Policy it was stated that de facto occupation (timeframe – indefinite!) of the province of Kosovo and Metohija was a "correction" of D. Eisenhower's missed chance to keep an American military presence in Yugoslavia at the end of the Second World War. Other conclusions of the conference speak for themselves: The recognition of Kosovo as an independent state (contrary to the UN SC Resolution 1244); NATO started war against Yugoslavia in order to remove obstacles that appeared after the adoption of the new "Strategic Concept" in April 1999, and which represented European efforts to first provide a mandate of UN and OSCE; reestablishing a territorial situation between the Baltic Sea and Anatolia that existed in the time of the Roman Empire!; Serbia, therefore, must be excluded from European development **[8]**.

The NATO membership of Montenegro (2016) – conducted in undemocratic and aggressive manner is logical continuation of the same policy. As to further expansion, Macedonia (or what is left of it) will be first to join, then the pressure

on Serbia and the Republic of Srpska will inevitably reach its peak. Artificially created Serbian aspiration towards EU membership (as on the first place lack of independent strategy of development) along with the preservation of vital Serbian national interests is impossible. The Balkan States are a perfect example of territories with some state attributes (modern concept of colonies), but in this case, with global efforts to suppress the R. F., they are also "frontline towards Russia". General F. B. Hodges, in a recent interview for "Voice of America," said that Serbia and countries of the region "must be given support and protection from pressure from Russia" and identifies the Serbian Orthodox Church as the main obstacle to "finishing the job in the Balkans." This is not mentioned by chance **[11]**. The mentioned article **[11]** about "Russian malign influence" is malign in another way – drawing conclusions out of nowhere, only in accordance to its own wishes or script. For example, mentioning Pan-Slavism, that is in reality very rarely mentioned and unknown to the majority of population, and if it is being mentioned it is done so as an answer to unbearable pressure and threat from those that are pointing there finger to it in the first place.

The influence of Turkey on the Balkans is, mainly due to its history, population, and economy. Aspirations towards Ottoman era influence aren't realistic. The rise of the Ottoman Empire is a consequence of the decline of the Byzantine Empire and unfair calculations by the Catholic Church regarding the Orthodox population and later policy of European powers aimed towards preserving and helping the Ottoman Empire as an obstacle towards Russia. (These were the natural and legitimate efforts of the Russian Empire to establish strong Orthodox states in the Balkans and to control Constantinople, due to its strategic significance, not mainly influenced by religion differences – the Crimean war (1853-6), among other consequences, provided time for consolidation of German and Austro-Hungarian empires and postponed some version of Balkan wars (1912-3), so Balkan wars did not happen when the possible outcome would be most satisfying, instead they occurred when any escalation should have been avoided.)

The Syrian campaign secured the stability of the Caucasus, relieved migration pressure on the EU and the Balkans. But did the Syrian campaign prevent or only postpone actions towards Iran and Central Asia? It depends on the further activity of the R.F. (military and diplomacy), but Syrian campaign did soften the consequences.

In case of the successful overthrow of President R. T. Erdogan, what would the role of Turkey be? Would Turkey be sacrificed by its partners in total destabilization of the Middle East, including Iran and S. Arabia? Yes, if its intention is to neutralize the Russian presence in Syria. Close enough relations between the R.F. and Turkey have created little improvement and a level of discomfort between Turkey and NATO.

Can the PRC act other than financially? The PRC avoids armed interventions with parallel strengthening of its armed forces. So question remains as to how battle worthy they can be when modern equipped Saudi forces are not able to resolve the conflict in Yemen, but only create chaos. (Or, could it be that they intend to provoke Iran into action and to have the ready pretext to act at a suitable moment? A lack of intelligence data is a reason these questions remain unanswered here.) The question of the capacity of the Chinese armed forces can be known only to some extent through military exercises.

The R.F. could have close relations with Italy, Austria, but with no substantial expectation. The awakening of national sentiments in EU states, if successful, and conducted throughout, won't offer a solution to certain questions; it will only articulate them in a different way. State borders established in Europe after the Second World War are not in accordance with "national reality", so they can represent a constant source of conflict. How migration affect European societies and how migration affects stability and the future of the many countries from the Middle East are serious questions.

From the time of the Mongolian invasions to this day, Russia has seen aggression only from the European direction. Only in case of Russian defeat (1941), the defeated side would lose its right to exist, as is so common for modern

"civilized societies" of the "west". Today, the situation is much more complex, with no strategic depth and today's demographic state. Internal instability (as in 1917) could provoke serious negative consequences. In modern warfare, for the communities on the territories where military actions are conducted – it is difficult, if not impossible to recover after a war. Military strengthening (as Russia has no aggressive policy), economic strengthening (as it won't be allowed throughout; the independence in high-tech and AI is vital in time that comes), and territorial expansion (Crimea) will not meet strong opposition. One process will trigger immediate action: demographic growth - the fundamental stability of the Russian nation and state, the only guarantee of stability). This cannot be achieved by copying foreign models of development but only by preservation of traditions and national self-consciousness. The lifestyle promoted in recent years by western cultures is degrading, and many measures conducted to stop the demographic fall in western countries have had no effect, so there is a constant need for more migrants in order to keep the economy from slowing down. However, migrants can't be the substitution for domestic population; once there was the slave trade and blood tax. Close relations with liberal, modern Europe would prove harmful for Russian society, and make it more susceptible to modern ideas that cannot be applied in the R.F. and which did not prevent the global stagnation of Europe.

UN SC, even with its many flaws, remains a "guardian of peace". The multipolar world needs a high level of diplomatic activity and consensus. Even though no new war has been started by the USA, under D. Trump, American aggressiveness remains high, and the situation is in many cases "on the edge". Or what is being understood as aggressiveness by someone is nothing more than a feature of a superpower.

"General Chernyayev took Tashkent. No one knows why and what for…" is written in the diary of the minister of internal affairs of the Russian empire P. A. Valuev on July 20th, 1865. Today, Tashkent is the Headquarters of ODKB, a clear picture of the importance of Central Asia. Can the Russian Federation allow European (Balkan, to be precise) behavior, on the borders of Central Asia and the

Far East? No, this would create a tremendous level of pressure. Cooperation, like the Shanghai Cooperation Group, BRICS, the Euro-Asian Economic Union and especially bilateral relations are strong evidence that live diplomatic activity prevents isolation.

For Balkan, with all of its attributes, balance of power on global level, and strict code of conduct (international law) would be a great contribution and would bring peace and stability to the region.

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РАСШИРЕНИЕ НАТО НА БАЛКАНАХ: ИСТОЧНИК СТАБИЛЬНОСТИ?

NATO ENLARGEMENT IN BALKANS: SOURCE OF STABILITY?

Аннотация: в статье обращается внимание на особое место Балкан в истории НАТО. Автор анализирует недавнюю тенденцию расширения НАТО на Балканах и ее потенциальные последствия в регионе, а также проблемы, которые она ставит перед Россией в контексте споров по поводу архитектуры европейской безопасности.

Abstract: the article draws attention to the Balkans' particular place in NATO's history. The author analyzes NATO's recent enlargement trend in the Balkans and its potential impacts in the region, as well as the challenges it poses to Russia in the context of the disputes over the European security architecture.

Ключевые слова: НАТО, Балканы, расширение НАТО, военное присутствие, Россия, архитектура европейской безопасности.

Key words: NATO, the Balkans, NATO's expansion, military presence, Russia, European security architecture.

The Balkans have an important place in NATO's history. In the Cold War, the alliance's presence in the region was a relevant piece in the Western "containment" strategy against the Soviet Union **[17]**. After the Cold War, it was in the Balkans, too, during the 1990s war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), that NATO experienced its first combat engagements in history [1]. The alliance's interventions in the Yugoslav conflicts were crucial to NATO's doctrinal transformation and aspirations to a hegemonic role in the Post-Cold War international order. In this connection, it is worth recalling, finally, that it was in the Balkans that great power tensions over NATO's new activities started to heighten, an issue most famously illustrated by the 1999 Pristina Airport incident involving Russian troops **[5]**.

In recent years, the Balkans once again came to feature prominently in NATO's activities. In the wake of the Ukraine conflict, the region has been increasingly seen as a front in the wider Russian-Western rivalry. Media and high officials of NATO member states have expressed concern about Russia's influence in the Balkans **[7; 14]**, and the alliance's presence in the Balkan Black Sea coast has been boosted by patrols, brigades, training activities and the United States' (US) military support to member states like Bulgaria and Romania **[2]**.

An ongoing process in this context has particular relevance for debates on the European security architecture: the Balkans became the main arena for NATO's expansion. In a process largely justified by its promoters as a counterweight to Russia, Montenegro joined the alliance in June 2017, after almost a decade without entries of new members. In April 2020, North Macedonia, in another case framed by Western officials as a battle against Russia, became NATO's 30th member **[18; 19]**. In BiH, despite Serbs' moves for military

neutrality (following Serbia's policy), Croat and Bosniak leaders, as well as alliance officials, have been pushing for NATO accession **[8; 15]**. Finally, in Kosovo - recognized by the Western powers as an independent state -, representatives of the Albanian elite publicly swore loyalty to the US and expressed the desire to join NATO **[16; 20]**.

Supporters of this process consider NATO's expansion in the Balkans to be a stabilizing factor. According to this view, NATO expansion in the region means the strengthening of a community that strives for "security, prosperity and freedom" against a Russia whose "malign influence" aims to undermine security, stability and democracy **[12; 25]**. In fact, it can be said NATO has provided a degree of order in the Balkans since the Yugoslav conflicts. The alliance is commonly seen in Balkans states, particularly by the latter's elites, as a security guarantor **[4]**. The question, however, is in whose benefit this order is perceived to work and how it is built. Contrary to what NATO, its leading states and pro-NATO Balkan politicians allege, the current enlargement push, which has been occurring with methods of questionable legitimacy, has actually reinforced latent sources of discontent and instability in the region.

Montenegro's accession is a case in point. NATO is a highly divisive issue in the country which overlaps with strong identity divisions in Montenegrin society. Polls have historically shown support for NATO accession to be lower than rejection of it. Only recently did support grow to roughly match (or at best be a little higher than) rejection. NATO accession remained highly unpopular among the Serb community (an often pro-Russian community that comprises circa 30% of Montenegro's population) **[3]**. Although it was a sensitive, strongly polarizing issue, accession was not subjected to a referendum and was confirmed in a largely boycotted parliamentary vote. Together with other foreign policy-related issues, like the controversial trial of Serb opposition leaders accused of involvement in the alleged 2016 anti-NATO, pro-Russian coup plot **[22]**, NATO accession, by arousing sentiments of alienation and political disenfranchisement in a substantial

part of Montenegro's society, has the potential to reinforce division lines in the country **[3]**.

In BiH, whose political system is largely based on ethnic power sharing, NATO accession is fraught with similar discontents. While Bosniaks and Croats (together around two thirds of BiH's population), generally support accession, the Serbs (roughly the remaining third) commonly strongly oppose it and espouse pro-Russian views **[6]**. As the 2018-2019 political deadlock over BiH's controversial Reform Program with NATO showed, the push for accession without a broad domestic consensus challenged the country's political system **[9]**. Like other politically divisive issues, the NATO question can stimulate disputes over the very configuration of the Bosnian state.

Finally, there is North Macedonia's case. To be sure, NATO membership does enjoy cross-ethnic majoritarian support in the country's society and party politics **[11, 23]**. Although domestically less controversial than in BiH and Montenegro, North Macedonia's accession, however, was problematic. Under Western pressure, the North Macedonian government reached in June 2018 a deal with Greece over the Macedonia name dispute - an important element of Slavic Macedonian identity that made Athens block Skopje's wishes to join Western-led Euro-Atlantic institutions for years. A consultative referendum in September 2018 was supposed to legitimate the agreement as a ticket for the continuation of the NATO accession process. The referendum was held with a nontransparent question (the name change was not explicitly mentioned) and, despite an almost unanimous vote in favor of the agreement and NATO membership, had a turnout far lower than the threshold stipulated as valid. Nevertheless, the North Macedonian parliament ignored these shortcomings and approved the decision in 2019 **[23]**. As in the examples above, the North Macedonian case illustrates how the Western goal of NATO enlargement in the Balkans has challenged democratic decision making and local political and institutional particularities. In a region that has already seen institutional crises and social dissatisfaction in recent years **[13]**, the

question of NATO enlargement, especially in view of BiH's and Montenegro's cases, reinforced sources of contention in the Balkans.

Even though the Balkans are not commonly seen as part of what Russian officials and analysts called Moscow's "sphere of privileged interests" (a concept that implies the recognition of Russia's preeminent role in security issues in its post-Soviet zone of influence) **[24; 26]**, NATO enlargement in the Balkans poses relevant challenges for Russia. First, the alliance's expansion in the region has been following NATO's new anti-Russia paradigm. While the military impact of this process may not be so significant, given NATO's previous enlargement nearer Russia's borders and the small size of the Balkan states, enlargement on such anti-Russia basis not only affects Russia's image, but can also strengthen a sense of bloc discipline that can potentially obstruct Russia's presence (political, economic or in other dimensions) in the region. The anti-Russia rationale also means the strengthening of a NATO-centered security architecture in Europe that further weakens the prospects of legitimating Russia's role as a co-equal great power in a more plural order in the continent (as historically advocated by Moscow in initiatives like the Medvedev administration's European Security Treaty proposal of 2009) **[21; 24; 26]**.

A second challenge for Russia has to do with wider transformations in the Post-Cold War world order. Russia has been increasingly positioning itself as a counterweight to Western global influence. In the Balkans, awareness of such positioning is reinforced by Russia's historical ties with peoples and states in the region, especially Serbia and the Serb community. As several occasions in the recent past have indicated, local actors (both state and non-state ones) have sought Russia's support against perceived threatening moves by the Western powers and their allies in the Balkans. Being an element of Western influence, NATO enlargement, which is widely seen negatively by the Serb community, can make such expectations of counterweight emerge again. The way Moscow responds to them will likely affect the perceptions of Russia's global standing in its quest for a "polycentric" world order.

Finally, another challenge for Russia is the precedent effect of NATO accession in countries with societies divided along identity lines and foreign policy affinities. Some states of the former Soviet Union, where Russia sees greater implications for its security and foreign policy, exhibit social characteristics and face security integration dynamics similar to those of the Balkan states. Such is the case, for example, of Moldavia and Ukraine. The way NATO and local actors pursue integration in the Balkans provides Russia a grasp of how NATO's interactions with similar states in the Post-Soviet space may develop.

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ВЛИЯНИЕ ГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИИ НА ЕВРОАТЛАНТИЧЕСКУЮ БЕЗОПАСНОСТЬ

EFFECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

Аннотация: статья посвящена влиянию глобализации на евроатлантическую безопасность и деятельности НАТО по борьбе с такими угрозами, как рост нападений со стороны негосударственных субъектов, нетрадиционные «атаки» на государственный суверенитет и глобальные проблемы, игнорирующие национальное государство границы.

Abstract: the article is devoted to the effects of globalization on Euro-Atlantic security and the NATO activity of combating threats such as an increase in attacks by non-state actors, non-traditional "attacks" on state sovereignty and global issues which disregard nation-state boundaries.

Ключевые слова: НАТО, евроатлантическая безопасность, угрозы глобализации, партнерство.

Key words: NATO, Euro-Atlantic security, globalization threats, partnership.

Since the end of World War II, the Euro-Atlantic region has been at the forefront of developing modern international security systems and responses in order to avoid similar conflicts in the future. It is home to the oldest modern collective security organization – the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Established in 1949, NATO is an intergovernmental security organization comprised of 29 member countries from Europe and North America, making it one of the largest actors in the Euro-Atlantic security environment **[5]**. Despite this security force, there remains a lot of tension in the region. It hosts four of the five Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) (under the terms of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT]) and the two major powers involved in the Cold War: Russia (formerly part of the Soviet Union) and the United States. Despite its relatively peaceful reputation, there continues to be conflict in the Euro-Atlantic region, and the threats that the region receives are only increasing. One reason for the continued conflict in the region is that the existing institutions are not equipped to manage the emerging threats. For hundreds of years, the traditional security paradigm was limited to physical threats on the state. Since the dawn of the Information Age, the types of threats states experience have widely expanded. The three main issues that have arisen from globalization that make it more difficult for states to address their security are an increase in attacks by non-state actors, non-traditional “attacks” on state sovereignty, and global issues which disregard nation-state boundaries. This paper will explore how these dynamics challenge existing security institutions and analyze how NATO can evolve to address them while also reducing conflict with its neighbors.

Non-State Actors

Traditional security analyses largely focus on the threat that nation states pose to each other. They consider military size and technology, borders, soldiers

and weapons. There are clear interests and parties involved. Developments in technology have undoubtedly escalated security threats in the past, but the origin of the threats has not dramatically changed; it is still state-on-state, now just with nuclear weapons. Unlike nuclear weapons, which just escalated the level of security threats, the internet has changed the very nature of these threats. Only nation states had access to large-scale weapons, which reduced the type of actors that states considered an existential threat. However, the internet is accessible to everyone, and it is an extremely powerful tool. It was created as a research tool and has quickly evolved to transform the lives of millions for the better. However, the world-wide increase in networks, access to money and resources, as well as skills, have not only benefited nations, economies, and civilians, but also criminal networks and terrorists. Both of these groups pose a serious threat to the sovereignty of nation states. Criminal networks subvert the legal and economic norms of a state, and terrorists undermine social and political sovereignty by challenging the perception of trust and security people have towards their state.

The key to these organizations are their networks. Their decentralized nature means that NATO must expend more resources going after the various individuals in the network. Additionally, the resources needed to address these individuals are more common in police forces than standing armies. Of course, the armed forces could manage these types of investigations and stings, but they are much more resource intensive and become a jurisdictional issue between local police and national security forces. To be successful, the two would have to work well together with their priorities and protocols in line.

Cyber theft and cyber warfare are two types of threats states are increasingly facing that are notoriously difficult to address. Governments have been largely ineffective at tackling intellectual property theft. Although the government should be able to protect its people and businesses from economic espionage and counterfeiting, this isn’t realistic in practice. The lack of physical borders to cross in cyberspace makes trafficking and espionage particularly easy and low-risk. Not only is it more difficult to catch the trafficking in the first place, it is especially

difficult to police non-physical spaces like the internet. Even if you can "catch" an account, states must overcome the attribution problem. Additionally, there is often a lack of consensus over the jurisdiction in which the crime took place because multiple states can be involved at once.

Another major issue that arises when non-state actors are involved is that NATO does not have the ability to go after non-state actors in non-member states because it would violate that state's sovereignty. The pre-emptive strike argument is ineffective in this situation because a state would not invade the sovereignty of another nation in order to defend against an independent agent operating illegally in that country. This would only be plausible if the activities were state sponsored. This is also becoming increasingly difficult to prove as technology used to hide associations improves. International security organizations are left with few options for practical defense against non-state actors.

Non-Traditional Attacks

NATO was created with the principle collective defense on the basis of Westphalian sovereignty – the concept of nation-state sovereignty based on territorial integrity and governmental hegemony over domestic structures **[3**, p. 31-41**]**. Historically, this meant that sovereignty existed in the absence of interference of foreign actors on domestic soil. It also meant that other actors did not disrupt the business of the government. This has been summarized by the state having a "monopoly on violence." Challenges to a state's sovereignty can include non-state intruders as well as non-state actors within the state who attempt to disrupt or divert state activities. This type of threat – often embodied by warlords or criminal organizations – is included in the doctrine of Westphalian sovereignty, but is less explicitly acknowledged by NATO's doctrine.

For example, NATO's doctrine of collective defense in Article 5 states that an attack against one Ally is considered an attack on all Allies **[1**, p. 3**]**. This language invokes an image of a physical attack on the territory of an Ally. As illustrated previously, although NATO's doctrine does not preclude non-state actors or non-physical attacks, the language "attack" is not generally associated

with other security risks such as economic, social or environmental risks that threaten the security of a state. Cyber-attacks, economic espionage, political meddling, and sowing social discord are all examples in which states or non-state actors can threaten a state's monopoly on violence/sovereignty. These types of risks, which are characterized by challenging state authority without attacking in the traditional sense, are rapidly rising as globalization, powered by technological developments, continues to spread. They are also becoming more common because the perpetrators know that the existing security infrastructure is ill-equipped to deal with these types of attacks. Because they are so new, there are fewer international rules and agreements that allow for retaliation or guide prosecution.

Global Issues

Not only do international norms and rules give individual states and organizations legitimacy when addressing non-traditional "attacks," they also provide the foundation for tackling global issues. There are roughly two types of global issues: the ones that are international in nature (i.e. climate change) and those that are international issues because we now lived in a globalized society (i.e. terrorism, cyber warfare). These global threats, much like the criminal networks, must be addressed at multiple points and in multiple ways. This presents two problems. The first is simply the age old collective action problem.

Because many global threats are non-traditional, they may not receive the prioritization they require. States will often assume that their efforts would be worthless or the burden to address them would be too high given the results when there aren't others also willing to address the issue. Additionally, states will often rely on others to address the issues. Similar to the collective action problem, this is known as the free-rider problem. International organizations like NATO do not have the power to coerce states or other security organizations to engage in a specific behavior in order to reduce a threat if the threat is not directly emanating from that country. Thus, there is no way for security organizations to force their way out of a collective action problem on global issues.

Even if the organization had the resources to tackle global issues on its own, it would not be successful because global threats require global solutions and the participation of all states involved. An attempt to address a global issue that may be occurring in another state would violate that state's sovereignty. For example, one cannot remove the threat of a terrorist cell hiding in a country without violating that state's sovereignty if the state refuses to cooperate. One could also not address an existential issue like climate change if half the world continues to burn fossil fuels at unprecedented rates.

Evolution of NATO

In order to remain relevant, NATO will need to evolve to deal with these emerging threats. Some of the change will occur internally as the organization changes its resources, tactics, policies, etc. However, in order to be successful, security organizations like NATO and states in general will need the backing of international rules and agreements. This requires collective action on an even broader scale to be successful. It appears that although regional security organizations have been highly successful in the past, we have reached a point where they cannot always effectively protect member-states from security threats. In order to protect its members from globalized issues, regional organizations are having to turn to non-members for mutual benefit. To its credit, NATO has already begun to do this. It currently has 40 partners around the world **[5]**. These partners allow it to address global issues like criminal networks and extremism.

Cooperation with Non-members and Partners

But what happens when another state or region does not want to be involved? Not every state will want to partner with NATO. In the last five years, NATO's relationship with Russia has deteriorated over the issue of Ukraine. This is a political example, but other issues that states might have are the costs or ideological differences. One of NATO's biggest dilemmas when addressing international issues is how to address these issues with or without the support of other actors in their region or world without appearing as an existential threat to

the non-members or partners. This will be difficult as the organization increasingly relies on the idea of extraterritorial jurisdiction – a concept often used by the United States in which a government legally exercises its authority beyond its boundaries **[2].**

NATO must make clear to states who feel threatened by its presence – especially as its partnerships and the states who seek membership continue to grow. Arguably, NATO's greatest public image conflict is how they are viewed by the Russians. Russia and NATO ended their relations when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. Ukraine is not a NATO member; however, the annexation of Crimea violated Western views of state sovereignty.

Both sides have good points about the other. The West accuses Russia of engaging in "strategic uncertainty." – the act of being intentionally ambiguous in an effort to make deterrence more difficult and undermine the political cohesion of adversaries **[4**, p. 108-118**]**. This can also be used when a state has conflicting domestic and foreign policies. On the other hand, Russia recognizes the inherent hypocrisy of Western values versus its actions. It claims to value state sovereignty, but in reality, it is more respectful of democratic states' sovereignty because it values democratic systems above state sovereignty. While this is an understandable hierarchy of values, it seems only applicable to non-democratic states. The variance in application of Western values makes it seem hypocritical to outsiders.

Conclusion

Realistically, the best way for states in the Euro-Atlantic region to protect themselves against global threats is to have global partnerships. This does not mean adopting a block mentality. In fact, it means quite the opposite. It requires states to build networks much like the ones from which they are receiving threats. The nature of stately interactions is changing. These changes began with liberalism in the post-World War II era as states created alliances and cooperative organizations like NATO. However, if these organizations want to remain relevant, they must evolve to match the new types of threats that they face.

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ОРУЖИЕ ИСКУССТВЕННОГО ИНТЕЛЛЕКТА ВЕДЕТ К РЕКАПИТАЛИЗАЦИИ ЕВРОПЫ И ПОДРЫВАЕТ СТРУКТУРУ НАТО

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WEAPONS LEAD TO RECAPITALIZATION OF EUROPE AND UNDERMINE NATO STRUCTURE

Аннотация: в настоящей статье анализируются последствия военного прогресса в Европе. Автор отмечает, что система искусственного интеллекта приводит к необходимости реструктуризации военной базы НАТО из-за отсутствия соответствующих регламентов.

Abstract: the present article analyses the effects of military progress in Europe. The author notes that the Artificial Intelligence system leads to the necessity of NATO military basis restructure due to the absence of appropriate regulations.

Ключевые слова: НАТО, военные силы, технический прогресс, оружие искусственного интеллекта, реструктуризация, баланс сил.

Key words: NATO, military forces, technological progress, Artificial Intelligence weapons, restructure, balance of power.

Technological development is unavoidable in the military sphere considering the morality of state. When the power of one country levels a threat against another country's sovereignty, the threatened country enforces actions to equalize its military strength, consequently ushering in a new stage of the arms race. In the XXI century, Artificial Intelligence weapons, such as drones, autonomous planes, and unmanned maritime techniques have been being invented and implemented in military forces. For instance, The Royal Navy tested The Pacific 950 during NATO exercises in Portugal, cooperating with the Portuguese Navy, Belgium, Italy, Poland, the US and Turkey, as well as the NATO Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation **[5]**. Similar experiments in the future will possibly spur the arms race among states instead of preserving peace in Europe and its bordered regions. Therefore, it is conceivable that the step that NATO has put forward has advantages and disadvantages in the region.

Although some experts and officials of NATO claim that the organization is not seeking to be weaponized with killer robots, national governments, defense ministries, and non-governmental organizations are advancing formulas and techniques with guns programmed to detect, target, and shoot automatically. Additionally, among member states, controversy has arisen as to whether humanoid soldiers should be deployed or banned. As an illusion, BAE Taranis Drone, an autonomous aircraft with the capability of capability of reaching speeds of more than 700 mph, was developed and tested in the UK **[2]**. It is reported that the Taranis stealth drone was designed to demonstrate multiple surveillance and combat tasks that would help shape the future of drone design. Tests conducted in the Australian desert have included complete stealth flight and simulated weapons release tests **[6]**. In the meantime, Germany and France have been pushing forward proposals to restrict machine guns and draw up an international treaty on precise regulations concerning them. German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas, speaking at

the conference "2019. Capturing Technology. Rethinking Arms Control", urged the global community to outlaw manufacturing killer robots. Nevertheless, neither Germany nor France are listed among the active 22 countries called to ban AI weapons. It is noticeable that officials of most regional countries are conscious about the effects of new types of arms in future warfare. If terminators become a reality, the structure of NATO as well as the balance of power in Europe will change. The reason is that modern arms enlarge the gap among member states in terms of their militaries, which leads to a room in a considerably large part of Europe, from Northern Italy and Austria in the West to Romania in the East and from Estonia in the North to Greece, including Turkey in the South. There are several possible scenarios to conquer the room by AI manufacturers in case a robotic army came to existence.

As usual, the United States initially provided NATO members with cognitive weapons under the guise of protecting them from the threat of Eastern powers or fighting against terrorism, at least joint-surveillance-operations. Valerie Insinna and Aaron Mehta reported in 2017 that the United States is actively pursuing a change to a major arms control treaty that would open the door for wider exports of military drones **[3]**. The list below illustrates states on the threshold of acquiring military drones.

(Copyright: Johanna Polle, MALE-Drone Proliferation in Europe: Assessing the Status Quo Regarding Acquisition, Research and Development, and Employment. Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg. November 2018.)

In its current condition, NATO is pressuring bordered countries and spurring on the arms race. As a result, Russia and Turkey, though its membership in the organization, may be able to develop their own AI weapons to keep the balance. Leaders of NATO can thereby secure the unity and structure of their alliance. Nonetheless, there are a number of shortcomings which are caused by the

distribution and commerce of military drones. For instance, the originators of robotics armies only multiply their competitors as well as magnify the possibility of acquisition of killer robots by terrorist groups.

On the occasion that the United States and the United Kingdom constrict or lessen weapon sales to the other member states in order to protect national interests and supremacy, space from the Russian borders to the coasts of Portugal would be excluded from market competition. When modernized types of military devices are invented, the balance of power along with global and regional order collapses. In the meantime, alliances and organizations cease their existence due to their inadequacy of contemporary international relations. Although NATO leaders' implementation of unmanned machines strengthens themselves, it undermines the unanimity of cooperation. Stability that relies on nuclear missiles is likely to be replaced by the turmoil of Artificial Intelligence techniques and technologies. On that condition, manufacturers especially depict their allies as consumers evaluating disgrace among members. Ironically, external producers of intelligent robots definitely try to win the chance of achieving the confidence of a market purchaser. As an illustration, after conquering the Middle Eastern market, Chinese combat drones reportedly came to Europe for the first time. Serbia is expected to receive of nine Chengdu Pterodactyl-1 (Wing Loong) drones **[7]**. Although drones produced by Asian power have not crossed NATO borders yet, US experts are worrying about the dramatic rise of Chinese unmanned weapons distribution around the world and their approach to the organization's space.

"More than two years later, China's growing share of the armed drone market is on display. To date, only the United Kingdom, France, and Italy have bought an armed version of the MQ-9 Reaper, while other U.S. allies, including Jordan, are flying Chinese drones, such as the CH-4 **[8]**" – writes Sharon Weinberger in the Foreign Policy journal.

Secondly and most significantly, Russian power looms over NATO regardless of whether AI machines are shared or not among member states. For example, it is reported that two Poseidon-carrying submarines will enter service

with the Northern Fleet and that the other two will join the Pacific Fleet. Each of the submarines will carry a maximum of eight drones and, therefore, the total number of Poseidons on combat duty may reach 32 vehicles. Poseidon is an underwater drone weapon, armed with a 2-megaton nuclear or conventional payload that can be detonated "thousands of feet" below the surface. This is meant to generate a radioactive tsunami capable of destroying coastal cities and other infrastructure several kilometers inland **[1]**. The supersonic power of the Eastern neighbor tends to be so impressive to allies that they are beginning to consider buying Russian weapons. Additionally, Russian systems are more suitable for low budget nations. To address the issue, the U.S. State Department has, in the last year, quietly launched a new program known as the European Recapitalization Incentive Program (ERIP), a new tool developed by the U.S. European Command to try to speed up the process of getting allied nations off Russian gear. As envisioned, it targets Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Greece, North Macedonia, and Slovakia **[4]**.

The situation shows that military basis of NATO requires restructuring, because there is no complete agreement on modern types of armament and their joint implementation. The Artificial Intelligence system is substituting conventional weapons as well as the balance of power based on nuclear missiles. As a result, member states of NATO are divided into three groups:

Producers of killer robots are those who own their projects and experience in the AI drones sphere (the United States with its Marine Corps program, Joint Air-to-Ground Missile (JAGM) missile system and Predators or the United Kingdom with its BAE Taranis system)

States which are capable enough to buy and place new type of weapons into their forces (mainly Western and Northern European states)

Countries with an inadequate budget or operational skills (especially Southern and Central European states)

Admittedly, NATO is a military organization from its root established to oppose the USSR. It is clear that any transformation of military domain

ameliorates its basic structure. Artificial Intelligence robots are undermining conventional systems and rules among allies. In the future either the United States recapitalizes on the military markets of NATO states, or Russia and China will be on the threshold of alleviating the unanimity of the organization though bilateral and multilateral agreements supplemented by cheap and efficient new generation robots.

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К сведению авторов

Правила предоставления рукописей для публикации в научном электронном журнале «Вестник ученых-международников»

В редакцию журнала предоставляется авторский оригинал статьи (на русском языке) в распечатанном виде (с датой и подписью автора) или в электронной форме по электронной почте, содержащей текст в формате «Word» (версия 1997–2003).

Весь текст набирается шрифтом TimesNewRomanCyr, кеглем 14 pt, с полуторным междустрочным интервалом. Отступы в начале абзаца — 0,7 см, абзацы четко обозначены.

Поля (в см): слева и сверху — 2, справа и снизу — 1,5. Нумерация — «от центра» с первой страницы. Объем статьи — не более 15–16 тыс. знаков с пробелами (с учетом аннотаций, ключевых слов, примечаний, списков источников).

Структура текста:

1. **Сведения об авторе / авторах на русском и английском языках:** имя, отчество, фамилия, должность, место работы, ученое звание, ученая степень, домашний адрес (с индексом), контактные телефоны (раб., дом.), адрес электронной почты, — размещаются перед названием статьи в указанной выше последовательности (с выравниванием по правому краю).
2. **Название статьи на русском и английском языках**
3. **Аннотация статьи на русском и английском языках** (3–10 строк) об актуальности и новизне темы, главных содержательных аспектах, размещается после названия статьи (курсивом).
4. **Ключевые слова на русском и английском языках** по содержанию статьи (8–10 слов), которые размещаются после аннотации.
5. **Основной текст статьи,** желательно разбитый на подразделы (с подзаголовками).
6. **Список источников и литературы**

Сокращения типа т.е., т.к. и подобные набираются через неразрывный пробел.

В тексте используются кавычки «…», если встречаются внутренние и внешние кавычки, то внешними выступают «елочки», внутренними «лапки».

В тексте используется длинное тире (-), получаемое путем одновременного нажатия клавиш **«Ctrl» + «Alt» + «-»**, а также дефис (-).

Таблицы, схемы, рисунки и формулы в тексте должны нумероваться; схемы и таблицы должны иметь заголовки, размещенные над схемой или полем таблицы, а каждый рисунок — подрисуночную подпись.

Список источников и литературы оформляется в соответствии с принятыми стандартами и выносится в конец статьи. Источники даются в алфавитном порядке (русский, другие языки). Отсылки к списку в основном тексте даются в квадратных скобках [номер источника в списке, страница].

Примечания нумеруются арабскими цифрами (с использованием кнопки меню текстового редактора «надстрочный знак» — x2). При оформлении библиографических источников, примечаний и ссылок автоматические «сноски» текстового редактора не используются.

Подрисуночные подписи оформляются по схеме: название/номер файла иллюстрации — пояснения к ней. Номера файлов в списке должны соответствовать названиям/номерам предоставляемых фотоматериалов.

Иллюстративные материалы — в электронной форме (фотография автора обязательна, иллюстрации) — отдельными файлами в форматах TIFF/JPG разрешением не менее 300 dpi.

Не допускается предоставление иллюстраций, импортированных в «Word», а также их ксерокопий.

Ко всем изображениям автором предоставляются подрисуночные подписи (включаются в файл с авторским текстом).

Заполненный в электронной форме Договор авторского заказа (высылается дополнительно)

Рецензия обязательна для всех авторов статей, кроме тех., кто входит Редакционного совета или Редакционной коллегии Журнала. Рекомендательное письмо научного руководителя — обязательно для публикации статей аспирантов и соискателей.

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О факте изъятия статьи редакция сообщает автору, который представил статью, рецензенту и организации, где работа выполнялась.

Плата с аспирантов за публикацию рукописей не взимается.

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Статьи, оформленные без учета вышеизложенных Правил, к публикации не принимаются.

Правила составлены с учетом требований, изложенных в приказе Министерства образования и науки РФ от 25.07.2014 № 793.

The rules for submission of manuscripts for publication in the Academic periodic electronic journal "IR SCIENTISTS HERALD"

In the journal is the author's original article (in Russian) in printed form (with date and signature of the author) and in electronic form containing the text in Word (version 1997-2003).

All the text is typed in Times New Roman Cyr, font 14 pt, with single line spacing. The indents at the beginning of the paragraph — 0.7 cm, paragraphs clearly marked. Field (in cm): left and top — 2, right and bottom is 1.5. Numbering — "from the heart" from the first page. The volume of the article — no more than 15-16 thousand characters with spaces (including abstracts, keywords, notes, list of sources).

The structure of the text:

Information about author / authors: name, patronymic, surname, position, affiliation, academic title, academic degree, address (including zip code), phone numbers (work, home), the email address is placed before the title in the above sequence (right-aligned).

The title of the article

The abstract (lines 3-10) on the relevance and novelty of the topic, the main substantive aspects, is placed after the article title (in italics).

Keywords on the content of the article (8-10 words), which are placed after the abstract.

The main text of the article, preferably split into sub-sections (with headings).

The initials in the text are drawn through a non-breaking space name (by pressing the keys **"Ctrl"** + **"Shift"** + **"space"**. Between the initials no spaces.

Reduction type i.e., as and the like are drawn through a non-breaking space.

In the text, use quotation marks "...", if there are internal and external quotation marks, the external act "Christmas tree", the internal "legs".

The text uses a dash (-), obtained by simultaneously pressing the keys **"Ctrl"** + **"Alt"** + **"-"**, and the hyphen (-).

Tables, charts, figures, and formulas in the text should be numbered; diagrams and tables should have captions placed above the diagram or table field, and each picture is a caption.

List of References/ sources used (if included in the list of electronic resources) shall be in accordance with accepted standards and shall be made at the end of the article. Sources are given in alphabetical order (Russian, other languages). Reference to the list in the main text are given in square brackets [the number of the source in the list, the page]

Notes are numbered with Arabic numerals (using the menu buttons text editor "Superscript a" — x2). In the design of bibliographic sources, notes and References automatic "footnotes" text editor is not used. "Footnote" is given in the interlinear on the 1st page in case the instructions on the continuation of the article and/or the source of the publication.

Captions are under the scheme: name/file number of illustrations notes thereto (what/who is where; for images of book covers and their contents bibliographic description; etc.). The file numbers in the list must match the names/numbers of the provided photographs.

Materials in English — about the author/authors, title, abstract, keywords (in hard copy and in electronic form (second separate file on a email) containing the text in Word (version 1997-2003).

Illustrative materials in electronic form (photo by the author, illustrations) — separate files in TIFF/JPG with resolution not less than 300 dpi.

Not permitted to provide illustrations, imported into "Word" and also the copies thereof.

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Filled in the electronic form of the Contract of author's order (sent separately)

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